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• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Series Contents
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Series Preface
• Series Introduction
• Volume Introduction
• Ontological problems in nyāya, buddhism and jainism a comparative analysis
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Vedāntaparibhāṣā as systematic reconstruction
• I
• II
• The nyayā-vaiśeṣika theory of universals
• I. Statement OF THE THEORY
• II. OBJECTIONS TO THE THEORY BY OTHER SCHOOLS
• III. RESTRICTIVE CONDITIONS FOR UNIVERSALS
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Review article more things in heaven and earth
• Notes
• Negative Facts and Knowledge of Negative Facts
• Introduction
• I Negative FACTS
• II ABSENCES AND KNOWLEDGE OF ABSENCES
• Notes
• References
• Mereological considerations in vasubandhu’s “proof of idealism”* (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhiḥ)
• Appendix: Viṃśatikā, 11–15; The Proof of Idealism22
• i. Rejection of possible alternatives to idealism (v. 11).
• ii. Refutation of atomism (v. 12–14).
• iii. Refutation of the doctrine of simple, extended wholes (v. 15).
• iv. Conclusion
• Notes
• Causality in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school
• Notes
• An ontology of concbete connectors1
• Ethics And ethics and the moral life1
• Dependent arising and the emptiness of emptiness: why did nācārjuna start with causation?
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Chapter 1—Examination of Conditions
• 3 Chapter 24 —Examination of the Four Noble Truths
• 4 The Emptiness of Emptiness
• 5 Simple Emptiness versus the Emptiness of Emptiness
• 6 The Importance of Causation
• 7 Antimetaphysical Pragmatism in Buddhism
• Appendix: TRANSLATION OF CHAPTERS 1, 2, AND 24 OF THE MŪLAMĀDHYAMIKAKĀRIKĀ (TRANSLATED FROM THE TIBETAN TEXT)
• Chapter 1—Examination of Conditions
• Chapter 2—Examination of Motion
• Chapter 24 —Examination of the Four Noble Truths
• Notes
• References
• Freedom and Determinism from an Indian Perspective
• Reductionist and nonreductionist theories of persons in indian buddhist philosophy
• Introduction
• Vasubandhu’s Statement of his theory of persons
• Seeing Oneself as a Self and the Cause of Suffering
• Vasubandhu’s Basic Argument For This Theory
• (i) The Selfless Persons Argument
• (ii) The Continuum Persons Argument
• Avoidance OF THE TWO EXTREMES AND THE MODE OF EXISTENCE OF PERSONS
• Notes
• Self-construction in buddhism
• I
• II
• III
• Buddhist reductionism
• Notes
• References
• The Mīmāṃsā theory of self-recognition
• I
• II
• Abbreviations
• Notes
• I Touch What I Saw
• 0. Introduction: Real ism-links
• 1. The Method: Good old Nyāya Wine in a Fregean Bottle
• 2. The Ego and the It
• 3. Backtracking: Someone In Here Entails Something Out There
• 4. Conclusion: Externalism without Qualms
• Dehātmavāda or the body as soul Exploration of a possibility within nyāya thought
• Translator’s Notes
• Notes and References
• An eccentric ghost in the machine: Formal and quantitative aspects of the Sāṁ khya-Yoga dualism
• Mind/Consciousness Dualism in Sāṅkhya-Yoga Philosophy
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Sāṅkhya-Yoga Dualism
• 3 The Distinction Between Consciousness and Content
• 4 Cartesianism and the Chinese Room
• 5 Conclusion
• References
• The Self in Advaita Vedānta
• I. Paramātman
• II. Jīvātman
• 1. The Phenomenal Status of the Jīva
• 2. The Nature of the Jīvātman
• III. Fruitfulness of the Advaitic Analysis
• The Concept Of The Absolute And Its Alternative Forms
• Acknowledgments