Managerial Economics and Strategy, Global Edition

Höfundur Jeffrey M. Perloff; James A. Brander

Útgefandi Pearson International Content

Snið Page Fidelity

Print ISBN 9781292159140

Útgáfa 2

Höfundarréttur 2018

4.790 kr.

Description

Efnisyfirlit

  • Half Title Page
  • Title Page
  • Copyright Page
  • Brief Contents
  • Contents
  • Preface
  • Chapter 1 Introduction
  • 1.1 Managerial Decision Making
  • Profit
  • Trade‐Offs
  • Other Decision Makers
  • Strategy
  • 1.2 Economic Models
  • Mini‐Case Using an Income Threshold Model in China
  • Simplifying Assumptions
  • Testing Theories
  • Positive and Normative Statements
  • Summary
  • Chapter 2 Supply and Demand
  • Managerial Problem Carbon Taxes
  • 2.1 Demand
  • The Demand Curve
  • The Demand Function
  • Using Calculus Deriving the Slope of a Demand Curve
  • Summing Demand Curves
  • Mini‐Case Summing Corn Demand Curves
  • 2.2 Supply
  • The Supply Curve
  • The Supply Function
  • Summing Supply Curves
  • 2.3 Market Equilibrium
  • Using a Graph to Determine the Equilibrium
  • Using Algebra to Determine the Equilibrium
  • Forces That Drive the Market to Equilibrium
  • 2.4 Shocks to the Equilibrium
  • Effects of a Shift in the Demand Curve
  • Q&A 2.1
  • Effects of a Shift in the Supply Curve
  • Managerial Implication Taking Advantage of Future Shocks
  • Effects of Shifts in both Supply and Demand Curves
  • Mini‐Case Genetically Modified Foods
  • Q&A 2.2
  • 2.5 Effects of Government Interventions
  • Policies That Shift Curves
  • Mini‐Case Occupational Licensing
  • Price Controls
  • Mini‐Case Venezuelan Price Ceilings and Shortages
  • Sales Taxes
  • Q&A 2.3
  • Managerial Implication Cost Pass‐Through
  • 2.6 When to Use the Supply‐and‐Demand Model
  • Managerial Solution Carbon Taxes
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 3 Empirical Methods for Demand Analysis
  • Managerial Problem Estimating the Effect of an iTunes Price Change
  • 3.1 Elasticity
  • The Price Elasticity of Demand
  • Managerial Implication Changing Prices to Calculate an Arc Elasticity
  • Q&A 3.1
  • Mini‐Case Demand Elasticities for Google Play and Apple Apps
  • Using Calculus The Point Elasticity of Demand
  • Elasticity Along the Demand Curve
  • Q&A 3.2
  • Other Demand Elasticities
  • Mini‐Case Anti‐Smoking Policies May Reduce Drunk Driving
  • Demand Elasticities over Time
  • Other Elasticities
  • Estimating Demand Elasticities
  • 3.2 Regression Analysis
  • A Demand Function Example
  • Mini‐Case The Portland Fish Exchange
  • Multivariate Regression
  • Q&A 3.3
  • Goodness of Fit and the R2 Statistic
  • Managerial Implication Focus Groups
  • 3.3 Properties and Statistical Significance of ‐Estimated Coefficients
  • Repeated Samples
  • Desirable Properties for Estimated Coefficients
  • A Focus Group Example
  • Confidence Intervals
  • Hypothesis Testing and Statistical Significance
  • 3.4 Regression Specification
  • Selecting Explanatory Variables
  • Mini‐Case Determinants of CEO Compensation
  • Q&A 3.4
  • Functional Form
  • Managerial Implication Experiments
  • 3.5 Forecasting
  • Extrapolation
  • Theory‐Based Econometric Forecasting
  • Managerial Solution Estimating the Effect of an iTunes Price Change
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 4 Consumer Choice
  • Managerial Problem Paying Employees to Relocate
  • 4.1 Consumer Preferences
  • Properties of Consumer Preferences
  • Mini‐Case You Can’t Have Too Much Money
  • Preference Maps
  • 4.2 Utility
  • Utility Functions
  • Ordinal and Cardinal Utility
  • Marginal Utility
  • Using Calculus Marginal Utility
  • Marginal Rates of Substitution
  • 4.3 The Budget Constraint
  • Slope of the Budget Line
  • Using Calculus The Marginal Rate of Transformation
  • Effects of a Change in Price on the ‐Opportunity Set
  • Effects of a Change in Income on the ‐Opportunity Set
  • Q&A 4.1
  • Mini‐Case Rationing
  • Q&A 4.2
  • 4.4 Constrained Consumer Choice
  • The Consumer’s Optimal Bundle
  • Q&A 4.3
  • Mini‐Case Why Americans Buy More E‐Books Than Do Germans
  • Q&A 4.4
  • Promotions
  • Managerial Implication Designing Promotions
  • 4.5 Deriving Demand Curves
  • 4.6 Behavioral Economics
  • Tests of Transitivity
  • Endowment Effects
  • Mini‐Case How You Ask the Question Matters
  • Salience
  • Managerial Implication Simplifying ‐Consumer Choices
  • Managerial Solution Paying Employees to Relocate
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Appendix 4A The Marginal Rate of Substitution
  • Appendix 4B The Consumer Optimum
  • Chapter 5 Production
  • Managerial Problem Labor Productivity During Recessions
  • 5.1 Production Functions
  • 5.2 Short‐Run Production
  • The Total Product Function
  • The Marginal Product of Labor
  • Using Calculus Calculating the Marginal Product of Labor
  • Q&A 5.1
  • The Average Product of Labor
  • Graphing the Product Curves
  • The Law of Diminishing Marginal Returns
  • Mini‐Case Malthus and the Green Revolution
  • 5.3 Long‐Run Production
  • Isoquants
  • Mini‐Case A Semiconductor Isoquant
  • Substituting Inputs
  • Q&A 5.2
  • Using Calculus Cobb‐Douglas Marginal Products
  • 5.4 Returns to Scale
  • Constant, Increasing, and Decreasing Returns to Scale
  • Q&A 5.3
  • Mini‐Case Returns to Scale for Crocs
  • Varying Returns to Scale
  • Managerial Implication Small Is Beautiful
  • 5.5 Innovation
  • Process Innovation
  • Mini‐Case Robots and the Food You Eat
  • Organizational Innovation
  • Mini‐Case A Good Boss Raises Productivity
  • Managerial Solution Labor Productivity During Recessions
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 6 Costs
  • Managerial Problem Technology Choice at Home Versus Abroad
  • 6.1 The Nature of Costs
  • Opportunity Costs
  • Mini‐Case The Opportunity Cost of an MBA
  • Q&A 6.1
  • Costs of Durable Inputs
  • Sunk Costs
  • Managerial Implication Ignoring Sunk Costs
  • 6.2 Short‐Run Costs
  • Common Measures of Cost
  • Using Calculus Calculating Marginal Cost
  • Cost Curves
  • Production Functions and the Shapes of Cost Curves
  • Using Calculus Calculating Cost Curves
  • Short‐Run Cost Summary
  • 6.3 Long‐Run Costs
  • Mini‐Case Short Run Versus Long Run in the Sharing Economy
  • Input Choice
  • Managerial Implication Cost Minimization by Trial and Error
  • Mini‐Case The Internet and Outsourcing
  • Q&A 6.2
  • The Shapes of Long‐Run Cost Curves
  • Mini‐Case Economies of Scale at Google
  • Q&A 6.3
  • Long‐Run Average Cost as the Envelope of Short‐Run Average Cost Curves
  • Mini‐Case Long‐Run Cost Curves in Beer Manufacturing and Oil Pipelines
  • 6.4 The Learning Curve
  • Mini‐Case Learning by Drilling
  • 6.5 The Costs of Producing Multiple Goods
  • Mini‐Case Medical Economies of Scope
  • Managerial Solution Technology Choice at Home Versus Abroad
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Appendix 6A Long‐Run Cost Minimization
  • Chapter 7 Firm Organization and Market Structure
  • Managerial Problem Clawing Back Bonuses
  • 7.1 Ownership and Governance of Firms
  • Private, Public, and Nonprofit Firms
  • Mini‐Case Chinese State‐Owned Enterprises
  • Ownership of For‐Profit Firms
  • Firm Governance
  • 7.2 Profit Maximization
  • Profit
  • Two Steps to Maximizing Profit
  • Using Calculus Maximizing Profit
  • Q&A 7.1
  • Managerial Implication Marginal Decision Making
  • Profit over Time
  • Managerial Implication Stock Prices Versus Profit
  • 7.3 Owners’ Versus Managers’ Objectives
  • Consistent Objectives
  • Q&A 7.2
  • Conflicting Objectives
  • Q&A 7.3
  • Mini‐Case Company Jets
  • Corporate Social Responsibility
  • Monitoring and Controlling a Manager’s Actions
  • Takeovers and the Market for Corporate Control
  • Mini‐Case The Yahoo! Poison Pill
  • 7.4 The Make or Buy Decision
  • Stages of Production
  • Vertical Integration
  • Profitability and the Supply Chain Decision
  • Mini‐Case Vertical Integration at Zara
  • Mini‐Case Aluminum
  • Market Size and the Life Cycle of a Firm
  • 7.5 Market Structure
  • The Four Main Market Structures
  • Comparison of Market Structures
  • Road Map to the Rest of the Book
  • Managerial Solution Clawing Back Bonuses
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Appendix 7A Interest Rates, Present Value, and Future Value
  • Chapter 8 Competitive Firms and Markets
  • Managerial Problem The Rising Cost of Keeping On Truckin’
  • 8.1 Perfect Competition
  • Characteristics of a Perfectly Competitive Market
  • Deviations from Perfect Competition
  • 8.2 Competition in the Short Run
  • How Much to Produce
  • Q&A 8.1
  • Using Calculus Profit Maximization with a Specific Tax
  • Whether to Produce
  • Mini‐Case Fracking and Shutdowns
  • Managerial Implication Sunk Costs and the Shutdown Decision
  • The Short‐Run Firm Supply Curve
  • The Short‐Run Market Supply Curve
  • Short‐Run Competitive Equilibrium
  • 8.3 Competition in the Long Run
  • Long‐Run Competitive Profit Maximization
  • The Long‐Run Firm Supply Curve
  • Mini‐Case The Size of Ethanol Processing Plants
  • The Long‐Run Market Supply Curve
  • Mini‐Case Entry and Exit of Solar Power Firms
  • Mini‐Case An Upward‐Sloping Long‐Run Supply Curve for Cotton
  • Long‐Run Competitive Equilibrium
  • Q&A 8.2
  • Zero Long‐Run Profit with Free Entry
  • 8.4 Competition Maximizes Economic Well‐Being
  • Consumer Surplus
  • Managerial Implication Willingness to Pay on eBay
  • Producer Surplus
  • Q&A 8.3
  • Q&A 8.4
  • Competition Maximizes Total Surplus
  • Mini‐Case The Deadweight Loss of Christmas Presents
  • Effects of Government Intervention
  • Q&A 8.5
  • Managerial Solution The Rising Cost of Keeping On Truckin’
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 9 Monopoly
  • Managerial Problem Brand‐Name and Generic Drugs
  • 9.1 Monopoly Profit Maximization
  • Marginal Revenue
  • Using Calculus Deriving a Monopoly’s Marginal Revenue Function
  • Q&A 9.1
  • Choosing Price or Quantity
  • Two Steps to Maximizing Profit
  • Using Calculus Solving for the Profit‐Maximizing Output
  • Effects of a Shift of the Demand Curve
  • 9.2 Market Power
  • Market Power and the Shape of the Demand Curve
  • Managerial Implication Checking Whether the Firm Is Maximizing Profit
  • Mini‐Case Cable Cars and Profit Maximization
  • The Lerner Index
  • Mini‐Case Apple’s iPad
  • Q&A 9.2
  • Sources of Market Power
  • 9.3 Market Failure Due to Monopoly Pricing
  • Q&A 9.3
  • 9.4 Causes of Monopoly
  • Cost‐Based Monopoly
  • Q&A 9.4
  • Government Creation of Monopoly
  • Mini‐Case The Canadian Medical Marijuana Market
  • Mini‐Case Botox
  • 9.5 Advertising
  • Deciding Whether to Advertise
  • How Much to Advertise
  • Using Calculus Optimal Advertising
  • Q&A 9.5
  • Mini‐Case Super Bowl Commercials
  • 9.6 Networks, Dynamics, and Behavioral ‐Economics
  • Network Externalities
  • Network Externalities and Behavioral Economics
  • Network Externalities as an Explanation for Monopolies
  • Mini‐Case Critical Mass and eBay
  • Managerial Implication Introductory Prices
  • Managerial Solution Brand‐Name and Generic Drugs
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 10 Pricing with Market Power
  • Managerial Problem Sale Prices
  • 10.1 Conditions for Price Discrimination
  • Why Price Discrimination Pays
  • Mini‐Case Disneyland Pricing
  • Which Firms Can Price Discriminate
  • Managerial Implication Preventing Resale
  • Mini‐Case Preventing Resale of Designer Bags
  • Not All Price Differences Are Price Discrimination
  • Types of Price Discrimination
  • 10.2 Perfect Price Discrimination
  • How a Firm Perfectly Price Discriminates
  • Perfect Price Discrimination Is Efficient but Harms Some Consumers
  • Mini‐Case Botox Revisited
  • Q&A 10.1
  • Individual Price Discrimination
  • Mini‐Case Google Uses Bidding for Ads to Price Discriminate
  • 10.3 Group Price Discrimination
  • Group Price Discrimination with Two Groups
  • Using Calculus Maximizing Profit for a Group Discriminating Monopoly
  • Q&A 10.2
  • Identifying Groups
  • Managerial Implication Discounts
  • Effects of Group Price Discrimination on Total Surplus
  • 10.4 Nonlinear Price Discrimination
  • 10.5 Two‐Part Pricing
  • Two‐Part Pricing with Identical Consumers
  • Two‐Part Pricing with Differing Consumers
  • Mini‐Case Available for a Song
  • 10.6 Bundling
  • Pure Bundling
  • Mixed Bundling
  • Q&A 10.3
  • Requirement Tie‐In Sales
  • Managerial Implication Ties That Bind
  • 10.7 Peak‐Load Pricing
  • Mini‐Case Downhill Pricing
  • Managerial Solution Sale Prices
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 11 Oligopoly and Monopolistic Competition
  • Managerial Problem Gaining an Edge from Government Aircraft Subsidies
  • 11.1 Cartels
  • Why Cartels Succeed or Fail
  • Mini‐Case The Apple‐Google‐Intel‐Adobe‐Intuit‐Lucasfilm‐Pixar Wage Cartel
  • Maintaining Cartels
  • Mini‐Case Cheating on the Maple Syrup Cartel
  • 11.2 Cournot Oligopoly
  • Airlines
  • Using Calculus Deriving a Cournot Firm’s Marginal Revenue
  • The Number of Firms
  • Mini‐Case Mobile Phone Number Portability
  • Nonidentical Firms
  • Q&A 11.1
  • Q&A 11.2
  • Managerial Implication Differentiating a Product Through Marketing
  • Mergers
  • Mini‐Case Acquiring Versus Merging
  • 11.3 Bertrand Oligopoly
  • Identical Products
  • Differentiated Products
  • 11.4 Monopolistic Competition
  • Managerial Implication Managing in the Monopolistically Competitive Food Truck Market
  • Equilibrium
  • Q&A 11.3
  • Profitable Monopolistically Competitive Firms
  • Mini‐Case Zoning Laws as a Barrier to Entry by Hotel Chains
  • Managerial Solution Gaining an Edge from Government Aircraft Subsidies
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Appendix 11A Cournot Oligopoly with Many Firms
  • Appendix 11B Nash‐Bertrand Equilibrium
  • Chapter 12 Game Theory and Business Strategy
  • Managerial Problem Dying to Work
  • 12.1 Oligopoly Games
  • Dominant Strategies
  • Best Responses
  • Failure to Maximize Joint Profits
  • Mini‐Case Strategic Advertising
  • Q&A 12.1
  • 12.2 Types of Nash Equilibria
  • Multiple Equilibria
  • Mini‐Case Timing Radio Ads
  • Mixed‐Strategy Equilibria
  • Mini‐Case Competing E‐Book Formats
  • Q&A 12.2
  • 12.3 Information and Rationality
  • Incomplete Information
  • Managerial Implication Solving Coordination Problems
  • Rationality
  • Managerial Implication Using Game Theory to Make Business Decisions
  • 12.4 Bargaining
  • Bargaining Games
  • The Nash Bargaining Solution
  • Q&A 12.3
  • Using Calculus Maximizing the Nash Product
  • Mini‐Case Nash Bargaining over Coffee
  • Inefficiency in Bargaining
  • 12.5 Auctions
  • Elements of Auctions
  • Bidding Strategies in Private‐Value Auctions
  • Mini‐Case Experienced Bidders
  • The Winner’s Curse
  • Managerial Implication Auction Design
  • Managerial Solution Dying to Work
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 13 Strategies over Time
  • Managerial Problem Intel and AMD’s Advertising Strategies
  • 13.1 Repeated Games
  • Strategies and Actions in Dynamic Games
  • Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
  • Mini‐Case Tit‐for‐Tat Strategies in Trench Warfare
  • Implicit Versus Explicit Collusion
  • Finitely Repeated Games
  • 13.2 Sequential Games
  • Stackelberg Oligopoly
  • Credible Threats
  • Q&A 13.1
  • 13.3 Deterring Entry
  • Exclusion Contracts
  • Mini‐Case Pay‐for‐Delay Agreements
  • Limit Pricing
  • Mini‐Case Pfizer Uses Limit Pricing to Slow Entry
  • Q&A 13.2
  • Entry Deterrence in a Repeated Game
  • 13.4 Cost and Innovation Strategies
  • Investing to Lower Marginal Cost
  • Learning by Doing
  • Raising Rivals’ Costs
  • Q&A 13.3
  • Mini‐Case Auto Union Negotiations
  • 13.5 Disadvantages of Moving First
  • The Holdup Problem
  • Mini‐Case Venezuelan Nationalization
  • Managerial Implication Avoiding Holdups
  • Too‐Early Product Innovation
  • Mini‐Case Advantages and Disadvantages of Moving First
  • 13.6 Behavioral Game Theory
  • Ultimatum Games
  • Mini‐Case GM’s Ultimatum
  • Levels of Reasoning
  • Managerial Implication Taking Advantage of ‐Limited Strategic Thinking
  • Managerial Solution Intel and AMD’s ‐Advertising Strategies
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Appendix 13A A Mathematical Approach to Stackelberg Oligopoly
  • Chapter 14 Managerial Decision Making Under Uncertainty
  • Managerial Problem BP’s Risk and Limited Liability
  • 14.1 Assessing Risk
  • Probability
  • Expected Value
  • Q&A 14.1
  • Variance and Standard Deviation
  • Managerial Implication Summarizing Risk
  • 14.2 Attitudes Toward Risk
  • Expected Utility
  • Risk Aversion
  • Q&A 14.2
  • Using Calculus Diminishing Marginal Utility of Wealth
  • Mini‐Case Stocks’ Risk Premium
  • Risk Neutrality
  • Risk Preference
  • Mini‐Case Gambling
  • Risk Attitudes of Managers
  • 14.3 Reducing Risk
  • Obtaining Information
  • Mini‐Case Bond Ratings
  • Diversification
  • Managerial Implication Diversify Your Savings
  • Insurance
  • Q&A 14.3
  • Mini‐Case Limited Insurance for Natural Disasters
  • 14.4 Investing Under Uncertainty
  • Risk‐Neutral Investing
  • Risk‐Averse Investing
  • Q&A 14.4
  • 14.5 Behavioral Economics and Uncertainty
  • Biased Assessment of Probabilities
  • Mini‐Case Biased Estimates
  • Violations of Expected Utility Theory
  • Prospect Theory
  • Managerial Implication Loss Aversion Contracts
  • Managerial Solution BP’s Risk and Limited Liability
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 15 Asymmetric Information
  • Managerial Problem Limiting Managerial Incentives
  • 15.1 Adverse Selection
  • Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets
  • Products of Unknown Quality
  • Q&A 15.1
  • Q&A 15.2
  • Mini‐Case Reducing Consumers’ Information
  • 15.2 Reducing Adverse Selection
  • Restricting Opportunistic Behavior
  • Equalizing Information
  • Managerial Implication Using Brand Names and Warranties as Signals
  • Mini‐Case Discounts for Data
  • Mini‐Case Adverse Selection and Remanufactured Goods
  • 15.3 Moral Hazard
  • Moral Hazard in Insurance Markets
  • Moral Hazard in Principal‐Agent Relationships
  • Mini‐Case Selfless or Selfish Doctors?
  • Q&A 15.3
  • 15.4 Using Contracts to Reduce Moral Hazard
  • Fixed‐Fee Contracts
  • Contingent Contracts
  • Mini‐Case Sing for Your Supper
  • Q&A 15.4
  • 15.5 Using Monitoring to Reduce Moral Hazard
  • Hostages
  • Mini‐Case Capping Oil and Gas Bankruptcies
  • Managerial Implication Efficiency Wages
  • After‐the‐Fact Monitoring
  • Managerial Solution Limiting Managerial Incentives
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 16 Government and Business
  • Managerial Problem Licensing Inventions
  • 16.1 Market Failure and Government Policy
  • The Pareto Principle
  • Cost‐Benefit Analysis
  • 16.2 Regulation of Imperfectly Competitive Markets
  • Regulating to Correct a Market Failure
  • Q&A 16.1
  • Mini‐Case Natural Gas Regulation
  • Regulatory Capture
  • Applying the Cost‐Benefit Principle to Regulation
  • 16.3 Antitrust Law and Competition Policy
  • Mergers
  • Mini‐Case Are Monopoly Mergers Harmful?
  • Predatory Actions
  • Vertical Relationships
  • Mini‐Case Piping Up about Exclusive Dealing
  • 16.4 Externalities
  • The Inefficiency of Competition with ‐Externalities
  • Reducing Externalities
  • Mini‐Case Pulp and Paper Mill Pollution and Regulation
  • Q&A 16.2
  • Mini‐Case Why Tax Drivers
  • The Coase Theorem
  • Managerial Implication Buying a Town
  • 16.5 Open‐Access, Club, and Public Goods
  • Open‐Access Common Property
  • Mini‐Case Spam
  • Club Goods
  • Mini‐Case Piracy
  • Public Goods
  • 16.6 Intellectual Property
  • Patents
  • Q&A 16.3
  • Managerial Implication Trade Secrets
  • Copyright Protection
  • Managerial Solution Licensing Inventions
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Chapter 17 Global Business
  • Managerial Problem Responding to Exchange Rates
  • 17.1 Reasons for International Trade
  • Comparative Advantage
  • Q&A 17.1
  • Managerial Implication Brian May’s Comparative Advantage
  • Increasing Returns to Scale
  • Mini‐Case Barbie Doll Varieties
  • 17.2 Exchange Rates
  • Determining the Exchange Rate
  • Exchange Rates and the Pattern of Trade
  • Managerial Implication Limiting Arbitrage and Gray Markets
  • Managing Exchange Rate Risk
  • 17.3 International Trade Policies
  • Quotas and Tariffs in Competitive Markets
  • Mini‐Case Russian Food Ban
  • Q&A 17.2
  • Rent Seeking
  • Noncompetitive Reasons for Trade Policy
  • Mini‐Case Dumping and Countervailing Duties for Solar Panels
  • Trade Liberalization and the World Trading System
  • Trade Liberalization Problems
  • 17.4 Multinational Enterprises
  • Becoming a Multinational
  • Mini‐Case What’s an American Car?
  • International Transfer Pricing
  • Q&A 17.3
  • Mini‐Case Profit Repatriation
  • 17.5 Outsourcing
  • Managerial Solution Responding to Exchange Rates
  • Summary
  • Questions
  • Answers to Selected Questions
  • Definitions
  • References
  • Sources for Managerial Problems, Mini‐Cases, and Managerial Implications
  • Index
  • Credits
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