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• Cover
• Publisher’s Notice
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Part One: Introduction and General Principles
• Chapter 1: Basic Ideas and Examples
• 1 What is a Game of Strategy?
• 2 Some Examples and Stories of Strategic Games
• 3 Our Strategy for Studying Games of Strategy
• Chapter 2: How to Think about Strategic Games
• 1 Strategic Games
• 2 Classifying Games
• 3 Some Terminology and Background Assumptions
• 4 The Uses of Game Theory
• 5 The Structure of the Chapters to Follow
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Part Two: Fundamental Concepts and Techniques
• Chapter 3: Games with Sequential Moves
• 1 Game Trees
• 2 Solving Games by Using Trees
• 3 Adding More Players
• 4 Order Advantages
• 5 Adding More Moves
• 6 Evidence Concerning Rollback
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Chapter 4: Simultaneous-Move Games: Discrete Strategies
• 1 Depicting Simultaneous-Move Games with Discrete Strategies
• 2 Nash Equilibrium
• 3 Dominance
• 4 Stronger and Weaker Forms of Dominance
• 5 Best-Response Analysis
• 6 Three Players
• 7 Multiple Equilibria in Pure Strategies
• 8 No Equilibrium in Pure Strategies
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Chapter 5: Simultaneous-Move Games: Continuous Strategies, Discussion, and Evidence
• 1 Pure Strategies that are Continuous Variables
• 2 Critical Discussion of the Nash Equilibrium Concept
• 3 Rationalizability
• 4 Empirical Evidence Concerning Nash Equilibrium
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Appendix: Finding a Value to Maximize a Function
• Chapter 6: Combining Sequential and Simultaneous Moves
• 1 Changing the Order of Moves in a Game
• 2 Alternative Methods of Analysis
• 3 Three-Player Games
• 4 Games with Both Simultaneous and Sequential Moves
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Chapter 7: Simultaneous-Move Games: Mixed Strategies
• 1 What is a Mixed Strategy?
• 2 Mixing in Zero-Sum Games
• 3 Nash Equilibrium as a System of Beliefs and Responses
• 4 Mixing in Non-Zero-Sum Games
• 5 General Discussion of Mixed-Strategy Equilibria
• 6 Mixing When One Player has Three or More Pure Strategies
• 7 Mixing When Both Players have Three Strategies
• 8 How to Use Mixed Strategies in Practice
• 9 Evidence on Mixing
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Appendix: Working with Probabilities
• Summary and Key Terms
• Part Three: Some Broad Classes of Strategies and Games
• Chapter 8: Strategic Moves
• 1 A Classification of Strategic Moves
• 2 Commitments
• 3 Threats and Promises
• 4 Some Additional Topics
• 5 Making Your Strategic Moves Credible
• 6 Countering Your Opponent’s Strategic Moves
• 7 Direct Communication, or “Cheap Talk”
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Chapter 9: Uncertainty and Information
• 1 Strategies for Dealing with Risk
• 2 Asymmetric Information: Basic Ideas
• 3 Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening
• 4 Signaling in the Labor Market
• 5 Equilibria in Two-Player Signaling Games
• 6 Two-Way Asymmetric Information and Dynamic Chicken
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Appendix: Inferring Probabilities from Observing Consequences
• Chapter 10: The Prisoners’ Dilemma and Repeated Games
• 1 The Prisoners’ Dilemma (Review)
• 2 Changing Payoffs: Morality, Penalties, and Rewards
• 3 Changing the Order of Moves: Promises
• 4 Changing the Way Moves are Made: Repetition
• 5 Experimental Evidence
• 6 Real-World Dilemmas
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Appendix: Infinite Sums
• Chapter 11: Collective-Action Games
• 1 A Brief History and Summary of Key Ideas
• 2 Collective-Action Games with Two Players
• 3 Collective-Action Problems in Large Groups
• 4 Spillover Effects, or Externalities
• 5 “Help!”: A Game of Chicken with Mixed Strategies
• 6 Further Reading
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Chapter 12: Evolutionary Games
• 1 The Framework
• 2 Some Classic Games in an Evolutionary Setting
• 3 The Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma
• 4 The Hawk–Dove Game
• 5 Evolution of Cooperation and Altruism
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Part Four: Applications to Specific Strategic Situations
• Chapter 13: Brinkmanship: The Cuban Missile Crisis
• 1 A Brief Narrative of Events
• 2 A Simple Game-Theoretic Explanation
• 3 Brinkmanship with Well-Controlled Risk
• 4 Brinkmanship with Uncontrolled Risk: A Game of Dynamic Chicken
• 5 Practicing Brinkmanship
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Chapter 14: Design of Incentives
• 1 Price Discrimination
• 2 Some Terminology
• 3 Information-Revealing Contracts
• 4 Evidence Concerning Information-Revelation Mechanisms
• 5 Incentives for Effort: The Simplest Case
• 6 Incentives for Effort: Evidence and Extensions
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Chapter 15: Auctions, Bidding Strategy, and Auction Design
• 1 What are Auctions?
• 2 The Winner’s Curse
• 3 Bidding in Auctions
• 4 Auction Design
• 5 Externalities in Auctions
• 6 Further Reading
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Appendix: Computing Bidding Equilibria
• Chapter 16: Strategy and Voting
• 1 Voting Rules and Procedures
• 2 Voting Paradoxes
• 3 Evaluating Voting Systems
• 4 Strategic Voting
• 5 The Median Voter Theorem
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Chapter 17: Bargaining
• 1 The Nash Cooperative Solution
• 2 Variable-Threat Bargaining
• 3 Alternating-Offers Model I: Total Value Decays
• 4 Alternating-Offers Model II: Impatience
• 5 Evidence on Bargaining
• 6 Manipulating Information in Bargaining
• 7 Bargaining with Many Parties and Issues
• Summary and Key Terms
• Exercises
• Glossary
• Index