Efnisyfirlit

• Cover
• Front Matter
• Editorial Advisors
• Title Page
• Copyright
• About Aspen Publishing
• Dedication
• Summary of Contents
• Contents
• Preface to the Third Edition: Preparations and Perspectives
• Acknowledgments
• Chapter 1 The Defining Dynamics of Corporate Governance: Purposes and Priorities
• 1.01 Introduction
• 1.02 Twelve Triads
• 1.03 The Separation of Ownership from Control
• 1.04 The Nexus of Contracts Model
• 1.05 The Director Primacy Model
• 1.06 Traditional vs. Modern Roles of Directors
• 1.07 Whose Interests Should Directors Serve?
• 1.07(A) The Berle-Dodd Debate
• 1.07(B) The Shareholder Primacy Model
• 1.07(C) The Communitarian Model
• 1.07(D) The Team Production Model
• 1.08 Governance Gumbo: The Genesis and Interaction of Practices, Rules, Statutes, and Regulations
• 1.09 Beyond Rules: Assimilating and Internalizing Corporate Governance Values
• 1.10 Drafting Considerations: Precedence and (Im)permanence
• Chapter 2 The Directors’ and Officers’ Powers and Processes (I): Duty of Due Care — Preparations and Precautions
• 2.01 The Rationality Requirement
• 2.02 The Requirement of Being Appropriately Informed
• 2.02(A) The Duty to Attend Meetings
• 2.02(B) The Duty to Know Basic Background Information About the Corporation and About Directors’ Responsibilities
• 2.02(C) The Duty to Prepare and to Participate
• 2.02(C)(1)(a) The Van Gorkom Decision
• 2.02(C)(1)(b) Fulfilling Directors’ Meeting-Related Duties
• 2.02(C)(1)(c) The Role of Robert’s Rules in Directors’ Meetings
• 2.02(C)(1)(d) Variable Voting for Directors
• 2.02(C)(2) The Delaware Supreme Court’s Disney Decision
• 2.02(C)(3) (Re)Drafting Exercise: Minutes of Directors’ Meeting
• 2.02(D) The Duty to Monitor the Corporation’s Activities and Performance
• 2.02(D)(1) The Caremark Decision
• 2.02(D)(2) The McCall and Abbott Laboratories Decisions
• 2.02(D)(3) The Delaware Supreme Court’s Disney Decision
• 2.02(D)(4) The Stone Decision
• 2.02(D)(4)(a) Special Concerns of Cybersecurity
• 2.02(D)(5) Other Requirements of, and for, Compliance Programs
• 2.02(D)(5)(a) The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
• 2.02(D)(5)(b) The Federal Sentencing Guidelines
• 2.02(D)(5)(c) Compliance Committees and Chief Compliance Officers
• 2.02(d)(5)(e) Other Doctrines of Liability
• 2.02(E) The Duty to Enhance Decision-Making?: A Précis of Proclivities and Predilections
• 2.02(E)(1) Patterns of Pitfalls
• 2.02(E)(2) Preventive Procedures, Policies, and Protocols
• 2.02(F) Emergency Bylaws
• Chapter 3 The Board’s Powers and Processes (II): Duty of Loyalty — Predispositions and Preclusions
• 3.01 Distinguishing Non-Interested from Independent
• 3.02 Identifying and Resolving Conflicts of Interest: State Corporate Law
• 3.02(A) Interested Director (or Officer) Transactions
• 3.02(B) Board Responses to Potential Changes of Control
• 3.02(B)(1) Conflict of Interest and the Duty of Loyalty
• 3.02(B)(2) Good Faith Component of the Duty of Loyalty
• 3.03 Related Party Transactions: SEC Regulation S-K
• 3.04 Identifying Independent Directors: The Exchanges’ Listing Requirements
• 3.05 Mechanisms for Independence
• 3.05(A) Meeting in Executive Session
• 3.05(B) “Lead Directors” or “Presiding Directors”
• 3.06 Compromised Independence?
• 3.06(A) “Structural Bias” and Personal Connections
• 3.06(B) Directors Dating Directors? Don’t.
• 3.07 Elements of the Duty of Loyalty: Discretion, in Word — and in Deed?
• 3.07(A) Leakers: The Duty Not to Reveal Details of Board Deliberations
• 3.07(B) Muddiers: The Duty Not to Dissent Publicly from the Board’s Position
• 3.07(B)(1) The ACLU Situation (2006)
• 3.07(B)(2) The Dartmouth Situation (2007)
• 3.07(C) Stainers: A Duty Not to Embarrass the Corporation?
• 3.07(C)(1) The “One-Name” Situation
• 3.07(C)(2) The “Imus” Situation
• 3.08 Committees of the Board
• 3.08(A) The Audit Committee
• 3.08(A)(1) Composition
• 3.08(A)(2) Operation
• 3.08(A)(3) The Audit Committee Charter
• 3.08(B) The Executive Committee
• 3.09 Fiduciary Duties of Care and Loyalty in Near-Insolvency, Insolvency, and Reorganization
• 3.09(A) Zone of Insolvency
• 3.09(B) Deepening Insolvency
• 3.09(C) Reorganization
• 3.10 Clarifying the “Honest Services” Liability of Directors and Officers
• 3.11 Questions on Contractually Specifying Fiduciary Duties of Care and Loyalty
• Chapter 4 The Role of Shareholders: Proxies and Proposals
• 4.01 Corporations as Democracies?
• 4.02 Types of Shareholders
• 4.02(A) Different Dividend/Liquidation Rights: Preferred Shareholders
• 4.02(A)(1) Venture Capitalists as Preferred Shareholders
• 4.02(B) Different Voting Rights: Common Stock
• 4.02(B)(1) “Supervoting” Common Stock
• 4.02(B)(2) Common Stock with Restricted Voting Rights
• 4.02(B)(3) Regulatory, Judicial, and Exchange Responses
• 4.02(B)(4) “Loyalty Shares”/“Tenure Voting”
• 4.02(C) Controlling Shareholders Holding Common Stock
• 4.02(D) Institutional Investors Holding Common Stock
• 4.02(D)(1) Pension Funds
• 4.02(D)(1)(a) “Relational Investing” and “Shareholder Engagement”
• 4.02(D)(2) Mutual Funds
• 4.02(D)(3) Hedge Funds
• 4.02(D)(4) Private Equity Funds
• 4.02(D)(5) Sovereign Wealth Funds
• 4.02(D)(6) Banks as Shareholders
• 4.02(D)(7) Influences on Institutional Shareholders: Proxy Advisory Firms and Governance Ratings Agencies
• 4.02(D)(8) Shareholder Advisory Committees
• 4.02(D)(9) The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)
• 4.02(D)(10) The Federal Government as Shareholder (2008)
• 4.02(E) Divorcing Voting from Ownership of Shares
• 4.02(E)(1) Vote-Buying Agreements
• 4.02(E)(2) “Empty Voting” Arrangements
• 4.03 The Interests of (Non-Shareholder) Creditors: Lenders and Bondholders
• 4.03(A) Credit Rating Agencies and Corporate Governance
• 4.03(B) “Vulture Investors”/“Distressed Debt Investors”
• 4.04 Shareholder Access to Documents and Executives
• 4.04(A) Access to Books and Records
• 4.04(B) Access to Directors
• 4.05 Shareholder Meetings and Forums
• 4.05(A) Meetings of Shareholders
• 4.05(A)(1) Annual Meetings of Shareholders
• 4.05(A)(2) Special Meetings of the Shareholders
• 4.05(A)(3) Shareholder Meetings in Chapter 11 Reorganizations
• 4.05(B) Virtual Meetings of Shareholders
• 4.05(C) Electronic Shareholder Forums
• 4.06 Proxies
• 4.07 Shareholder Proposals
• 4.07(A) Methods of Disseminating Proposals
• 4.07(A)(1) Management’s Proxy Statement, or Proponent’s Own Mailing
• 4.07(A)(2) Advance Notice Bylaws
• 4.07(B) Submitting Proposals; Grounds for Exclusion
• 4.07(B)(1) Improper Under State Law
• 4.07(B)(2) Violation of State Law
• 4.07(B)(3) Violation of Proxy Rules
• 4.07(B)(4) Personal Grievance; Special Interest
• 4.07(B)(5) Relevance
• 4.07(B)(6) Absence of Power or Authority
• 4.07(B)(7) Management Functions
• 4.07(B)(7)(a) The Roosevelt Decision
• 4.07(B)(7)(b) The Cracker Barrel Saga
• 4.07(B)(7)(c) No-Action Letters
• 4.07(B)(7)(d) The Wal-Mart Stores Saga
• 4.07(B)(8) Relates to Election
• 4.07(B)(9) Conflicts with Company’s Proposal
• 4.07(B)(10) Substantially Implemented
• 4.07(B)(11) Duplicative
• 4.07(B)(12) Resubmitted
• 4.07(B)(13) Specific Amount of Dividends
• 4.07(C) Institutional Investors and Proposals
• 4.08 Shareholder-Adopted and -Amended Bylaws
• 4.09 Forum Selection Provisions
• 4.10 Fee-Shifting Provisions
• 4.11 Mandatory Arbitration Provisions
• Chapter 5 Nominating, Electing, and Removing Directors: Prerequisites and Performances
• 5.01 Qualifications and Disqualifications
• 5.01(A) Personal and Professional Attributes and Background
• 5.01(A)(1) Criteria; Defining and Enhancing Diversity; Executive and Non-Executive Chairs
• 5.01(A)(1)(a). Diversity Considerations
• 5.01(A)(1)(b). A “Financial Literacy” “Requirement”
• 5.01(A)(1)(c). Combining Chair and CEO Roles
• 5.01(A)(1)(d). The Executive Chair
• 5.01(A)(2) The Obama Administration’s Questionnaire
• 5.01(B) Shareholder Proposals Concerning Director Qualifications
• 5.01(C) Constituency, Institutional, Professional, and Super Directors; Yanking the “Golden Leash”
• 5.01(D) Advisory Boards, Quasi-Directors, and Board Observers
• 5.01(D)(1) Advisory Boards
• 5.01(D)(2) Advisory, Emeritus, and Honorary Directors
• 5.01(D)(3) Board Observers
• 5.02 Shareholder Nomination of Specific Candidates: “Proxy Access”
• 5.02(A) The Stance of the SEC
• 5.02(A)(1) The Staff Report (2003)
• 5.02(A)(2) Proposed Rule 14a-11: “Direct Access” (2003)
• 5.02(A)(3) Required Disclosures Concerning Nominating Committee Operations (2003)
• 5.02(A)(4) Proposed Rule 14a-11 (2009 Version)
• 5.02(A)(5) Final Rule 14a-11 (2010); Struck Down (2011)
• 5.02(B) The Role of Rule 14a-8(i)(8)
• 5.02(B)(1) The AIG Decision (2006)
• 5.02(B)(2) Amendments to the Rule (2011)
• 5.02(C) Rejection of Proxy Access Proposals (2014)
• 5.02(D) Revisions to the Delaware General Corporation Law (2009)
• 5.03 The Nominating Committee and Its Operations
• 5.03(A) General
• 5.03(B) Nominating Advisory Committee Description
• 5.04 Shareholder Voting for Directors
• 5.04(A) Majority (Instead of Plurality) Voting
• 5.04(A)(1) The Voting of “Uninstructed Shares” by Brokers
• 5.04(A)(2) Revisions to the Model Business Corporation Act (2006)
• 5.04(A)(3) Revisions to the Delaware General Corporation Law
• 5.04(A)(4) The Pfizer Approach: Considering Resignation Offers
• 5.04(A)(5) The Intel Approach: “True” Majority Voting
• 5.04(B) Cumulative Voting
• 5.04(B)(1) The Effect of Classified (or, Staggered) Boards
• 5.04(C) Voting for Directors Less Frequently Than Annually
• 5.05 Removal of Executives
• 5.05(A) Removal of Directors
• 5.05(B) Defining “Cause” for Removal of Officers and Directors
• 5.05(C) “Refreshing” the Board: Age and Term Limits
• Chapter 6 Compensating Directors and Officers Appropriately: Payments and Performance
• 6.01 The Role, Composition, and Operation of the Compensation Committee
• 6.01(A) Role
• 6.01(B) Composition
• 6.01(B)(1) Requirement of, and Applicable Standards for, Independence
• 6.01(B)(1)(a) Listing Requirements
• 6.01(B)(1)(b) (Former) IRS Code Section 162(m)
• 6.01(B)(1)(c) SEC Rule 16b-3
• 6.01(B)(1)(d) Structural Bias, and How to Minimize It
• 6.01(B)(2) Other Qualifications of Committee Members
• 6.01(C) Operation
• 6.01(C)(1) Assessments
• 6.01(C)(1)(a) Of an Officer’s Performance
• 6.01(C)(1)(b) Of the Board’s Performance
• 6.01(C)(1)(c) Of a Director’s Performance
• 6.01(C)(2) Use and Independence of Compensation Consultants
• 6.01(C)(2)(a) Disclosure of Possible Conflicts of Interest (2009)
• 6.01(C)(2)(b) Independence of Committee and Consultants (2012)
• 6.01(D) Satisfying the Committee’s Fiduciary Duties
• 6.01(D)(1) Duty of Care: Compensation Reasonable, Not Wasteful
• 6.01(D)(2) Duty of Loyalty/Good Faith: “Entire Fairness” of Compensation Decision
• 6.01(D)(2)(a) Decisions Concerning Excessive Bonuses
• 6.01(D)(2)(b) Decisions Concerning Backdated or Spring-Loaded Options
• 6.02 Compensation Contracts and Components
• 6.02(A) Do Officers and Directors Need Contracts?
• 6.02(B) Elements of Compensation Policies
• 6.02(B)(1) The Appropriate Balance of Cash and Stock
• 6.02(B)(1)(a) For Officers
• 6.02(B)(1)(b) For Directors
• 6.02(B)(2) Perquisites
• 6.02(B)(3) General
• 6.02(B)(3)(a) Clawbacks
• 6.02(B)(3)(b) Proposed Exchange-Imposed Clawback Requirements
• 6.02(B)(4) Gross-Ups
• 6.02(B)(5) “Golden Hellos”
• 6.02(B)(6) Severance Payments
• 6.02(B)(7) “Golden Parachute”/“Change-in-Control” Payments
• 6.02(B)(8) Restrictions on Hedging and Pledging Shares
• 6.02(B)(9) Key Employee Retention Plans (KERPs)
• 6.03 SEC Rules on Disclosure of Executive Compensation; Compensation Disclosure and Analysis
• 6.03(A) The 1992 Revisions
• 6.03(B) The 2006 Revisions: Compensation Disclosure and Analysis
• 6.03(C) Staff Observations on Initial Review of Disclosures (2007)
• 6.03(D) The 2009 Revisions: Disclosure of Policies on Incentives for Risk-Takers
• 6.04 Shareholder Proposals and “Say on Pay”
• 6.04(A) Shareholder Proposals Concerning Executive Compensation
• 6.04(B) “Say on Pay” (2011)
• 6.04(B)(1) The Regulation
• 6.04(B)(2) Negative “Say on Pay” Votes
• 6.04(B)(3) Applications and Implications
• 6.05 Pay Ratio Disclosure (2017)
• Chapter 7 Corporate Social Responsibility: Profit-Maximizing vs. Philanthropy
• 7.01 Background
• 7.02 Diverging from “The Bottom Line”
• 7.02(A) Stakeholders and “Other Constituency” Statutes
• 7.02(B) Corporations Designated as Social Enterprises
• 7.02(B)(1) State-Recognized
• 7.02(B)(2) Certified by Third Parties
• 7.03 The Public Responsibility Committee
• 7.04 Liability for Corporate Social Responsibility Statements
• 7.04(A) Public Statements: The Kasky Chronicles
• 7.04(B) Enforceability of the Corporation’s Codes of Conduct
• 7.04(C) Parsing the Corporation’s Mission Statement and CSR Report
• 7.04(D) “Greenwashing”: Failure to Follow Through
• 7.05 Shareholder Proposals Concerning CSR
• Chapter 8 Special Considerations of Legal Ethics: Professionalism and Privilege
• 8.01 Roles and Representation(s) of the Lawyer
• 8.01(A) Representing the Entity
• 8.01(A)(1) Conflict with Also Representing Shareholders
• 8.01(A)(2) Potential Conflict with Also Representing Executives or Other Employees
• 8.01(B) The Lawyer-Director: Outside Counsel Also Serving as a Director
• 8.01(C) Counsel for Independent/Outside Directors Collectively
• 8.01(D) Counsel for Standing and/or Special Committee(s)
• 8.01(D)(1) The Tremont Decision
• 8.01(D)(2) The Oracle Decision
• 8.01(E) Corporate Ombudsman
• 8.01(F) Corporate Secretary
• 8.01(G) Internal Investigator
• 8.01(H) Chief Compliance Officer
• 8.02 The New Rules under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
• 8.02(A) Lawyers as Gatekeepers — and Whistleblowers?
• 8.02(B) Reporting Concerns, “Up” and “Out”
• 8.02(B)(1) Reporting Up: The Qualified Legal Compliance Committee
• 8.02(B)(2) Reporting Out: Loyal Disclosure
• 8.03(B)(3) Withdrawal as Counsel: Noisy Withdrawal; Disaffirmation
• 8.02(C) The “Yates Memo”
• 8.02(D) Additional Concerns in Effective Corporate Counseling
• APPENDICES
• Appendix A Recommended Resources for Corporate Governance Research
• Appendix B On Preparing and Presenting “Actionable” Advice
• Appendix C Ten Tips Towards Transparency in Posting Core Corporate Documents
• Index of Document-Drafting Considerations
• Table of Cases: Precedents and Progeny
• Index