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• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Series Preface
• Introduction
• PART I THE PURPOSE OF THE CORPORATION
• 1 A. A. Berle Jr (1931), ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’, Harvard Law Review, 44, pp. 1049–74
• 2 E. Merrick Dodd Jr (1932), ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’, Harvard Law Review, 45, pp. 1145–63.
• 3 Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman (2001), ‘The End of History for Corporate Law’, Georgetown Law Journal, 89, pp. 439–68.
• 4 William T. Allen (1992), ‘Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation’, Cardozo Law Review, 14, pp. 261–81.
• PART II THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS
• 5 Melvin Aron Eisenberg (1975), ‘Legal Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants’, California Law Review, 63, pp. 375–139.
• 6 Margaret M. Blair and Lynn A. Stout (1999), ‘A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law’, Virginia Law Review, 85, pp. 247-328.
• 7 Stephen M. Bainbridge (2003), ‘Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance’, Northwestern University Law Review, 97, pp. 547-606.
• PART III SHAREHOLDERS
• 8 Dalia Tsuk Mitchell (2006), ‘Shareholders as Proxies: The Contours of Shareholder Democracy’, Washington & Lee Law Review, 63, pp. 1503–78.
• 9 Marcel Kahan and Edward B. Rock (2007), ‘Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 155, pp. 1021–93.
• 10 Ronald J. Gilson and Curtis J. Milhaupt (2008), ‘Sovereign Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Mercantilism’, Stanford Law Review, 60, pp. 1345–69.
• PART IV A LOOK AT THE FUTURE?
• 11 Cindy A. Schipani and Junhai Liu (2002), ‘Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now’, Columbia Business Law Review, 2002, pp. 1–69.
• Name Index