Efnisyfirlit

• Cover
• Half title
• Title page
• Imprints page
• Contents
• Figures
• Tables
• Introduction to the Second Edition
• 1 Managing Crises
• 1.1 Crisis Management and Public Leadership
• 1.2 The Nature of Crises
• Crisis Typologies
• 1.3 The Origins of Crises
• 1.4 The Challenges of Strategic Crisis Management
• 1.5 The Five Critical Tasks of Strategic Crisis Leadership
• Task 1: Sense Making
• Task 2: Decision Making and Coordinating
• Task 3: Meaning Making
• Task 4: Accounting
• Task 5: Learning
• 2 Sense Making
• 2.1 What the Hell Is Going On?
• 2.2 Barriers to Crisis Detection
• The Nature of Crisis Development
• Organizational Barriers
• The Social and Political Construction of Threat Perception
• 2.3 Barriers to Understanding an Unfolding Crisis
• Dealing with Uncertainty Under Pressure
• Cognitive Limitations Imposed by Stress
• Organizational Factors
• 2.4 Effective Sense Making
• Mental Slides
• Command Rooms
• High Reliability Organizations
• The Promise of Social Media and Big Data
• 2.5 The Ubiquity of Surprise
• 3 Decision Making and Coordinating
• 3.1 The Myth of Top-Down Command and Control
• 3.2 Crisis Leaders as Decision Makers
• 3.3 Crisis Teams and Group Dynamics
• 3.4 Crisis Responses on the Ground
• Non-Decision Making
• Decentralization
• Improvisation
• 3.5 Crisis Coordination: Challenges, Forms, and Fault Lines
• Vertical Coordination: Negotiating Authority
• Horizontal Coordination: Matching Function to Place
• 3.6 Nurturing Crisis Coordination
• 3.7 Deciding and Coordinating: Conclusions
• 4 Meaning Making
• 4.1 The Politics of Crisis Communication
• 4.2 Framing Contests
• The Political Arena
• Traditional and Social Media
• The Public
• 4.3 Crafting a Winning Frame
• Persuasive Narratives
• Personal and Organizational Credibility
• Effective Crisis Communication
• 4.4 Effective Meaning-making
• 5 Ending a Crisis
• 5.1 It Ain’t Over Till It’s Over
• 5.2 How Crises End: Two Scenarios
• The Fast-Burning Crisis
• The Long-Shadow Crisis
• 5.3 To End a Crisis: What Role for Leadership?
• 5.4 Crisis Accountability: A Contest of Explanations
• Accountability: Actors and Venues
• 5.5 Managing the Accountability Contest
• Facing Inquiries: Stonewalling versus Cooperation
• Responding to Revelations: Denying Versus Acknowledging Error
• Coping with Verdicts: Perseverance Versus Resignation
• 5.6 Accountability, Blame Games, and Democracy
• 6 Learning and Changing
• 6.1 Never Again!
• 6.2 Learning from Crisis: Lessons from the Literature
• Why Learning from Crisis Is Hard
• 6.3 From Crisis to Reforms?
• Why Crises Enable Reform
• Critical Factors for Effective Reform
• Conditions for Success
• 6.4 The Tension Between Crisis Management and Reform Leadership
• Repair or Reform?
• Persuasion or Muscle?
• 6.5 Ambivalent Opportunities: From Crisis-Induced Reforms to Reform-Induced Crises
• 7 How to Deal with Crisis
• 7.1 Navigating Crises
• 7.2 Grasping the Nature of Crises
• 7.3 Improving Crisis Sense Making
• To See Crises Coming
• Develop a Clear and Timely Picture of the Unfolding Events and Their Implications
• Rumors Are a Potential Source of Information
• Dealing with the Stress of Crisis
• 7.4 Improving Crisis Decision Making and Coordination
• Centralizing Authority Is Overrated
• But the Critical Decisions Should Be Made by Strategic Leaders
• Crisis Planning Helps More than Crisis Plans Ever Will
• 7.5 Improving Crisis Meaning Making
• Leaders Who Do Not Communicate Persuasively Will Fail
• 7.6 Improving Crisis Accounting
• Crises Must Be Brought to Closure
• Accounting for Crises is Inevitable – and Risky
• Avoid Blame Games
• 7.7 Improving Crisis Learning and Reform Craft
• Learn – Don’t Just Copy or ‘Implement Recommendations’
• ‘Sweeping’ Reforms Are Not the Only Way to Learn From Crises
• 7.8 Being Prepared
• Organizing and Selecting
• Educating, Training, and Exercising
• Cultivating Vigilance
• 7.9 Prudent Crisis Leadership
• References
• Index