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• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• List of Abbreviations
• Chapter 1: The Objectives of Competition Policy and the Consumer Interest
• 1 Meaning of Competition and Consumer Welfare
• 1.1 Competition as a Process of Rivalry
• 1.2 Competition as the Absence of Restraint
• 1.3 Competition as a State of Perfect Competition
• 1.4 Competition as the Existence of Fragmented Industries and Markets
• 1.5 Competition as a State of Economic Freedom and Dispersal of Private Economic Power
• 1.6 Competition as a State of Affairs That Maximizes Consumer Welfare
• 2 Efficiency, Consumer Welfare and Consumer Interests
• 3 The Theory of Rivalry and the Theory of Automatic Exclusion: Protecting Competitors Rather than Consumers
• Chapter 2: Goals Underlying US Antitrust Law
• 1 Goals Other than Consumer Welfare
• 2 Consumer Welfare as the Sole Goal
• 3 Criticism of the Consumer Welfare Notion for a Broader Notion Protecting Consumer Interests
• 4 Consumer Interest Standard
• Chapter 3: Goals Underlying EC Competition Law
• 1 Market Integration as the Paramount Goal
• 2 A Multitude of Other Goals
• 2.1 Non-competition Concerns Affecting General Economic Policy
• 2.1.1 Competitiveness and Industrial Policy
• 2.1.2 Monetary Policy
• 2.1.3 Employment Policy
• 2.2 Non-economic Non-competition Policies
• 3 Consumer Well-Being: Not the Sole or Primary Goal of EC Competition Law
• 4 The Risk of ‘Capture’
• 5 A Consumer Interest Standard for the EU
• Chapter 4: Collusive Practices and Consumer Interests
• 1 The European Commission’s Approach to the Article 81(1) Prohibition
• 2 Vertical Restraints
• 3 The Effect of the Goal of Market Integration on Consumer Interests in the Context of Vertical Restraints
• 3.1 Contrasting US Approach to Vertical Restraints
• 3.2 Instances Where the Pursuit of the Market Integration Goal Coincides with the Promotion of Consumer Interests
• 3.3 Instances Where the Pursuit of the Market Integration Goal Can Damage Consumer Interests
• 4 Horizontal Restraints
• 4.1 Horizontal Agreements in the Form of Joint Ventures and Alliances
• 5 Licensing Agreements
• Chapter 5: The Legal Exception in Article 81 EC and the Consumer Interest
• 1 The Consumer Benefit Requirement in Article 81(3)
• 2 Safeguarding the Consumer Interest through Block Exemptions
• 3 A Consumer Interest Standard for Collusive Behaviour
• Chapter 6: Abusive Pricing and Consumer Interests
• 1 Dominance and Monopoly
• 2 The Concept of Abuse
• 3 Excessive Pricing
• 3.1 Unfair Prices to the Detriment of Consumers
• 3.2 Direct Price Control
• 4 Predatory Pricing
• 4.1 Below-Cost Pricing: When Is a Good Bargain a Raw Deal for Consumers?
• 4.2 Meeting Competition through Selective Below-Cost Pricing
• 4.3 Pricing in a Non-dominated Market
• 5 Price Discrimination
• 5.1 Meeting Competition through Selective Above-Cost Pricing
• 5.2 Price Differentiation on a Geographic Basis
• Chapter 7: Abusive Non-pricing Practices and Consumer Interests
• 1 Tying Arrangements
• 1.1 Different Forms of Tying
• 1.2 Implications for Consumers
• 1.3 US and EC Law on Tying
• 1.4 Detecting Tying and Recognizing Efficiencies and Consumer Benefits
• 2 Inefficient Management and ‘Quiet Life’
• 2.1 Unilateral Suppression of Own Technology
• 2.2 Unilateral Suppression of Competing Technology
• 3 Towards a More Careful Consideration of Consumer Harm and Consumer Benefits?
• Chapter 8: Merger Control and Consumer Interests
• 1 Reasons for Merger Control
• 1.1 Coordinated Interaction
• 1.2 Unilateral Effects
• 1.3 Exclusionary Behaviour and Portfolio Effects
• 1.4 Innovation Market Concept
• 1.5 Mergers between Potential Competitors
• 1.6 Vertical Mergers
• 2 The Appraisal Test in Merger Control
• 2.1 Safeguarding the Interests of Vulnerable Consumers
• 2.2 Market Power and the Level of Concentration: The Determining Factors
• 2.3 SLC Test versus Dominance Test
• Chapter 9: Efficiency Claims in US Merger Control: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest
• 1 Initial Reluctance
• 2 Reasons for Reluctance
• 3 Greater Acceptance of the Defence
• 4 A Guarded Approach to Efficiencies
• 5 A Two-Fold Test with a Consumer Benefit Qualification
• 5.1 Merger-Specific
• 5.2 Verifiable
• 5.3 Positive Proof of Passing of Efficiencies to Consumers: The Consumer Benefit Requirement
• 6 Courts’ Endorsement of the Consumer Benefit Test
• 7 Criticism of the Positive Proof Requirement in the Consumer Benefit Test
• 8 The ‘Sufficiency’ Requirement and Consumer Well-Being
• 8.1 Total Welfare Standard versus Consumer Interest Standard
• 8.2 Applying the Consumer Interest Standard: The Nature and Degree of Cost Savings Required
• 8.3 Trade-Off via the Rule of Reason Approach versus the Formal Rules Approach
• 9 Consideration of Efficiencies under Current US Merger Control Law
• Chapter 10: Consumer Interests under the EC Merger Control Regime
• 1 The Effect of Market Integration on Firms’ Efficiency Justifications for Merger
• 2 Efficiency Claims under Article 81 EC in the Context of the Cooperative Elements in a Joint Venture
• 3 Efficiency Claims under the Merger Regulation
• 3.1 Legislative Provisions
• 3.2 Commission Decisional Practice and Court Case Law
• 3.3 Efficiencies: An Undisclosed Factor in Merger Appraisal?
• 3.4 Post-2004: Explicit Consideration of Efficiencies against a Consumer Interest Standard
• 4 Towards a Merger Control Regime That Guarantees Consumer Well-Being
• Chapter 11: The Way Forward
• Bibliography
• Table of Cases
• Table of Legislation
• Index