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• Cover
• Half-title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Locke and the nature of language
• 1.1 Introduction
• 1.2 What Locke says
• 1.3 Meaning and signification
• 1.4 Problems about communication
• 1.5 Words and sentences
• 1.6 Locke’s less disputed assumptions
• Further reading
• 2 Frege on Sense and reference
• 2.1 Introduction
• 2.2 Psychologism and the Context Principle
• 2.3 Frege and logic
• 2.4 Frege’s mature system (i): reference
• 2.5 Frege’s mature system (ii): Sense
• 2.6 Two further uses of the notion of Sense
• 2.7 Questions about Sense
• 2.8 Sense and the Basic Worry
• Further reading
• 3 Russell on definite descriptions
• 3.1 Introduction
• 3.2 The problems
• 3.3 Russell’s solution in outline
• 3.4 Russell’s solution in detail
• 3.5 Strawson on definite descriptions
• 3.6 Donnellan on referential and attributive uses of descriptions
• 3.7 Russellian defences
• 3.8 Russell beyond descriptions
• Further reading
• 4 Kripke on proper names
• 4.1 Introduction
• 4.2 Kripke’s target
• 4.3 Kripke’s objections (i): simple considerations
• 4.4 Kripke’s objections (ii): epistemic and modal considerations
• 4.5 Defences of the description theory
• 4.6 Sense and direct reference
• 4.7 Conclusion
• Further reading
• 5 Natural-kind terms
• 5.1 Introduction
• 5.2 A Lockean view of natural-kind terms: the individualist version
• 5.3 A Lockean view without individualism
• 5.4 How can there be Kripke–Putnam natural-kind terms?
• 5.5 How can natural-kind terms be rigid designators?
• Further reading
• 6 Quine on de re and de dicto modality
• 6.1 Introduction
• 6.2 Quine’s three grades of modal involvement
• 6.3 Referential opacity and Leibniz’s law
• 6.4 Referential opacity and the three grades
• 6.5 Quine’s logical problem with de re modality
• 6.6 Quine’s metaphysical worries about de re modality
• Further reading
• 7 Reference and propositional attitudes
• 7.1 Introduction
• 7.2 Quine’s problem
• 7.3 Quine’s proposed solution
• 7.4 Perry and the essential indexical
• 7.5 The problems for Quine’s solution
• 7.6 Consequences
• Further reading
• 8 The semantics of propositional attitudes
• 8.1 Introduction
• 8.2 Kripke, names, necessity, and propositional attitudes
• 8.3 Kripke’s Pierre
• 8.4 Referential solutions to the puzzle
• 8.5 A Fregean response
• 8.6 Davidson’s proposal
• 8.7 Can Davidson’s proposal solve Kripke’s puzzle?
• Further reading
• 9 Davidson on truth and meaning
• 9.1 Introduction
• 9.2 Meanings as entities
• 9.3 Tarski’s ‘definition’ of truth
• 9.4 Davidson’s use of Tarski
• 9.5 The obvious objections to Davidson’s proposal
• 9.6 Truth and the possibility of general semantics
• 9.7 One final worry
• Further reading
• 10 Quine and Davidson on translation and interpretation
• 10.1 Introduction
• 10.2 Quine and radical translation
• 10.3 Davidson and radical interpretation
• 10.4 Statements of meaning and propositional attitudes
• 10.5 Theories of meaning and speakers’ knowledge
• 10.6 How fundamental is radical interpretation?
• Further reading
• 11 Quine on the indeterminacy of translation
• 11.1 Introduction
• 11.2 ‘Two dogmas of empiricism’
• 11.3 Indeterminacy and inscrutability
• 11.4 Resisting Quine on indeterminacy: some simple ways
• Further reading
• 12 Austin on speech acts
• 12.1 Introduction
• 12.2 Performative utterances
• 12.3 Towards a general theory of speech acts
• 12.4 Truth and performatives
• 12.5 Issues for a theory of speech acts
• Further reading
• 13 Grice on meaning
• 13.1 Introduction
• 13.2 Grice’s overall strategy
• 13.3 Sympathetic objections to Grice’s account of speaker-meaning
• 13.4 Sympathetic objections to Grice’s account of expression-meaning
• 13.5 An unsympathetic objection to Grice’s account of expression-meaning
• 13.6 An unsympathetic objection to Grice’s account of speaker-meaning
• 13.7 After Grice
• Further reading
• 14 Kripke on the rule-following paradox
• 14.1 Introduction
• 14.2 The sceptical challenge
• 14.3 The ‘sceptical solution’
• 14.4 A community-based response
• 14.5 Can dispositionalism be defended?
• 14.6 Anti-reductionism and radical interpretation
• Further reading
• 15 Wittgenstein on the Augustinian picture
• 15.1 Introduction
• 15.2 The Augustinian picture
• 15.3 The Anti-Metaphysical interpretation
• 15.4 The Quasi-Kantian interpretation
• 15.5 Worries about these Wittgensteinian views
• Glossary
• Works cited
• Index