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• Half-title
• Title page
• Copyright information
• Brief Contents
• Detailed Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Conceptual Foundations
• 1.1 Constitutional Political Economy As Part of the New Institutional Economics
• 1.2 Definitions
• 1.3 Concepts of the Constitution
• 1.3.1 The Constitution As a Social Contract
• 1.3.2 The Constitutional Contract As Principal–Agent Relationship
• 1.3.3 The Constitutional Contract As a Precommitment Device
• 1.3.4 The Constitution As a Bundle of Conventions
• 1.3.5 The Constitution As the Result of an Evolutionary Process
• 1.3.6 Summary
• 1.4 The Tools
• 1.4.1 Theory
• 1.4.2 Empirics
• 1.5 More Potentially Useful Tools
• 1.5.1 Experiments
• 1.5.2 Possible Consequences of Constitutional Rules
• 1.6 Consequences of Constitutional Rules
• 1.7 Measuring Constitutions
• 2 Democracy vs. Autocracy
• 2.1 How Best to Separate Democracy from Autocracy?
• 2.2 What Role Do Constitutions Play in Autocracy?
• 2.3 Do Autocracies and Democracies Perform Differently?
• 2.3.1 Theory
• 2.3.2 Empirical Evidence
• 2.3.2.1 Use Adequate Estimation Techniques
• 2.3.2.2 Ask More Precise Questions
• 2.4 Do We Have Good Reasons to Assume That Different Kinds of Autocracies Perform Differently?
• 2.4.1 Theory
• 2.4.2 Empirical Evidence
• 2.5 What Are the (Economic) Effects of Extending the Franchise?
• 2.6 What Factors Make a Country Switch from One Regime to Another?
• 2.6.1 Theory
• 2.6.2 Empirical Evidence
• 2.7 Summary and Outlook
• 3 Positive Constitutional Economics
• 3.1 Introductory Remarks
• 3.2 Basic Rights
• 3.2.1 Defining Rights
• 3.2.2 Effects of Basic Rights
• 3.2.2.1 Theory
• 3.2.2.2 Empirics
• 3.2.3 Determinants of Basic Rights
• 3.2.3.1 Theory
• 3.3 Horizontal Separation of Powers
• 3.3.1 Introductory Remarks
• 3.3.2 Branches of Government
• 3.3.3 Form of Government: Presidential vs. Parliamentary Regimes
• 3.3.3.1 Effects of Forms of Government
• 3.3.3.2 Determinants of Forms of Government
• 3.3.3.2.1 Theory
• 3.3.3.2.2 Empirics
• 3.3.4 The Structure of the Legislature: Bicameralism
• 3.3.4.1 Effects of Bicameralism
• 3.3.4.1.1 Theory
• 3.3.4.1.2 Empirics
• 3.3.4.2 Determinants of Bicameralism
• 3.3.5 A Forgotten Branch: The Judiciary
• 3.3.5.1 The (Economic) Effects of the Judiciary
• 3.3.5.1.1 Theory
• 3.3.5.1.2 Empirics
• 3.3.5.2 Determinants of Judicial Independence
• 3.3.5.2.1 Theory
• 3.3.5.2.2 Empirics
• 3.4 Vertical Separation of Powers: Federalism
• 3.4.1 Definitions
• 3.4.2 Effects of Federalism
• 3.4.2.1 Theory
• 3.4.2.2 Empirics
• 3.4.3 Determinants of Federalism
• 3.4.3.1 Theory
• 3.4.3.2 Empirics
• 3.5 The New Separation of Powers: Increasing the Number of Independent Decision-Makers
• 3.6 Representative vs. Direct Democracy
• 3.6.1 Introductory Remarks
• 3.6.2 Effects of Direct Democracy
• 3.6.2.1 Theory
• 3.6.2.2 Empirics
• 3.6.2.2.1 First-Generation Research: Focusing on the United States and Switzerland
• 3.6.2.2.2 Second-Generation Research: Cross-Country Studies
• 3.6.2.2.3 Third-Generation Research: Taking Endogeneity Seriously
• 3.6.3 Determinants of Direct Democracy
• 3.7 Electoral Systems
• 3.7.1 Effects of Electoral Systems
• 3.7.1.1 Theory
• 3.7.1.2 Empirics
• 3.7.2 Determinants of Electoral Systems
• 3.8 Summary
• 4 Conclusions and Possible Future Issues
• 4.1 Introductory Remarks
• 4.2 Conclusions
• 4.3 Rules for Choosing and Amending Constitutions
• 4.3.1 Introductory Remarks
• 4.3.2 Rules for Choosing Constitutions
• 4.3.2.1 Choice of Members
• 4.3.2.2 Size of Assembly
• 4.3.2.3 Time Limits
• 4.3.2.4 Public or Secret Meetings
• 4.3.2.5 Voting Rules
• 4.3.2.6 Public Participation
• 4.3.3 Procedural Rules for Changing Rules
• 4.4 Mind the Gap: Analyzing the Divergence between Constitutional Text and Constitutional Reality
• 4.4.1 Preliminary Remarks
• 4.4.2 How to Define and Measure the Gap?
• 4.4.3 Possible Determinants of the Gap: Theory
• 4.4.4 Challenges for Establishing Causality
• 4.4.5 Attempts to Analyze the Gap: Empirics
• 4.5 Emergency Constitutions
• 4.5.1 Introductory Remarks
• 4.5.2 Measurement Issues
• 4.5.3 Who Uses Emergency Constitutions?
• 4.5.4 Are Emergency Constitutions Effective?
• 4.5.5 Summary and Possible Implications for Future Research
• Appendix 1 Coding Countries according to Two Governance Scores
• Appendix 2 Empirical Results at a Glance: Constitutional Rules As Explanatory Variables and Cross-Co
• References
• Index