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• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Figures
• Tables
• Contributors
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Part I Whither Conditionality?
• 1 Who’s in Charge? Ownership and Conditionality in IMF-Supported Programs
• 2 Policy Conditionality
• 3 Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending
• A Political Economy Approach
• 4 Empirical Implications of Endogenous IMF Conditionality
• Part II The International and Domestic Politics of IFI Programs
• 5 The High Politics of IMF Lending
• 6 Money Talks
• Supplementary Financiers and IMF Conditionality
• 7 The World Bank and the Reconstruction of the ‘Social Safety Net’ in Russia and Eastern Europe
• 8 When the World Bank Says Yes
• Determinants of Structural Adjustment Lending
• 9 The Demand for IMF Assistance
• What Factors Influence the Decision to Turn to the Fund?
• 10 The Survival of Political Leaders and IMF Programs
• 11 Do PRSPs Empower Poor Countries and Disempower the World Bank, or is it the Other Way Round?
• Part III Possible Reforms of the IFIs
• 12 Macroeconomic Adjustment in IMF-Supported Programs
• Projections and Reality
• 13 The IMF and Capital Account Crises
• The Case for Separate Lender of Last Resort and Conditionality Functions
• 14 Should the IMF Discontinue its Long-Term Lending Role in Developing Countries?
• 15 IFIs and IPGs
• Operational Implications for the World Bank
• 16 Ownership, Dutch Disease and the World Bank
• Part IV Reflections on the International Infrastructure
• 17 Why it Matters who Runs the IMF and the World Bank
• 18 Do as I Say Not as I Do
• A Critique of G-7 Proposals on “Reforming” the MDBs