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• Half-title
• Title page
• Copyright information
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction
• Implementing Our Definition of Regime
• The Groups That Initiate Dictatorships
• Seizures Led by a Group of Military Officers
• Seizures Led by Parties
• Seizures Led by What Becomes a Ruling Family
• Conflict and Bargaining within the Seizure Group
• Plan of the Book
• Appendix Coding Rules for Authoritarian Regimes
• Part I Initiation
• 2 Autocratic Seizures of Power
• Who Do Dictatorial Seizure Groups Oust?
• How Dictatorships Begin
• Before the Seizure of Power
• The Morning after a Seizure of Power
• Post-Seizure Organization
• Conclusion
• 3 What Do We Know about Coups?
• Coups for Various Purposes
• Preconditions Associated with Regime-Change Coups
• Inequality and Coups
• Conclusion
• Part II Elite Consolidation
• 4 Power Concentration: The Effect of Elite Factionalism on Personalization
• Elite Bargaining in Dictatorships
• Handing Power to a Leader
• The Dictator’s Interests
• The Interests of Other Members of the Inner Circle
• Bargaining over the Distribution of Resources and Power
• Characteristics That Influence the Credibility of Threats to Oust the Dictator
• Measuring Personalism
• Patterns of Personalism
• The Effect of Factionalism on the Personalization of Power
• Conclusion
• 5 Dictatorial Survival Strategies in Challenging Conditions: Factionalized Armed Supporters and Part
• The Strategic Context
• The Interaction of Dispersed Arms and Factionalism
• The Strategic Creation of New Political Actors
• Evidence That Post-Seizure Party Creation Aims to Counterbalance Factionalized Armed Supporters
• Is Party Creation Usually Initiated by the Dictator?
• Is Post-Seizure Party Creation Part of a Military Marginalization Strategy?
• Can More United Militaries Deter Party Creation?
• Is Party Creation Part of a Strategy to Reduce the Dictator’s Vulnerability to Coups?
• Post-Seizure Party Creation and Dictatorial Survival
• The Effect of Post-Seizure Party Creation on the Likelihood of Coups
• Conclusion
• Part III Ruling Society: Implementation and Information Gathering
• 6 Why Parties and Elections in Dictatorships?
• Implementation, Monitoring, and Information Gathering
• Elite Competition and Institutions That Engage Citizens
• Parties
• The Limitations of Dictatorial Ruling Parties
• Why Dictatorial Ruling Parties Persist
• Dictatorial Legislatures
• Elections
• Tests of the Effects of Elections
• Conclusion
• 7 Double-Edged Swords: Specialized Institutions for Monitoring and Coercion
• Internal Security Agencies
• The Dangers of Personalized Control of Internal Security
• The Army: Bulwark of the Regime or Incubator of Plots?
• Counterbalancing
• Controlling Military Leadership
• The Relationship between Counterbalancing and Interference
• Conclusion
• Part IV Dictatorial Survival and Breakdown
• 8 Why Dictatorships Fall
• How Dictatorships End
• Individual Support and Opposition
• The Interests of Regime Insiders
• The Interests of Others
• Perceptions about Regime Survival
• The Effect of Crisis on Decisions to Oppose the Dictatorship
• Economic Crisis and Breakdown
• Empirical Approach
• Power Concentration and Regime Survival
• Data and Measurement
• Empirical Approach
• Results
• Leadership Changes and Regime Breakdown
• Death of the Dictator and Regime Survival
• The Dictator’s Future and the Likelihood of Democratization
• The Costs of Losing Power
• Costs of Losing Power in Military-Led Dictatorships
• The Costs of Losing Power in Party-Led Dictatorships
• Costs of Losing Power for Monarchs
• The Effect of Personalization on Prospects for Democracy
• Personalism in Military-Led Regimes
• Conclusion
• 9 Conclusion and Policy Implications
• References
• Index