Efnisyfirlit

• Half-title
• Title page
• Copyright information
• Brief Contents
• Detailed Contents
• Figures
• Tables
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 The Basics
• 1.1 The Standard Behavioral Model of Economics – and a Few Modifications Made by New Institutional E
• 1.1.1 From Perfect to Bounded Rationality
• 1.1.2 Transaction Costs
• 1.2 Institutions: Functions, Types, and Interrelationships
• 1.2.1 Definitions of Institutions
• 1.2.1.1 Characteristics of Rules
• 1.2.1.2 Types of Enforcement
• 1.2.2 Interactions between Internal and External Institutions
• 1.3 Research Questions
• 1.4 The Toolkit of Institutional Economists
• 1.4.1 Game Theory: A Tool for Analyzing Strategic Interaction Situations
• 1.4.1.1 A Coordination Game
• 1.4.1.2 A Mixed-Motive Game: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
• 1.4.2 Comparative Institutional Analysis
• 1.4.3 Experiments in the Laboratory or the Field
• 1.4.4 Case Studies Including Economic History
• 1.4.5 Econometric Tests
• 1.5 NIE’s Common Ground with and Differences from Other Research Programs
• 1.6 Open Questions
• Questions
• Further Reading
• 2 Simple Transactions
• 2.1 The Relevance of External Institutions for Simple Transactions
• 2.1.1 The Coase Theorem
• 2.2 The Relevance of Internal Institutions for Simple Transactions
• 2.2.1 Example 1: Norms of Cooperation and the Ultimatum Game
• 2.2.2 Example 2: Fairness Notions and Price Formation
• 2.3 The Relevance of Interplay between External and Internal Institutions for Simple Transactions
• 2.3.1 Conflicting External and Internal Institutions
• 2.3.2 Complementary External and Internal Institutions
• 2.3.3 Substitutive Relationship between External and Internal Institutions
• 2.3.4 Empirical Results on the Relationship between External and Internal Institutions
• 2.4 On the Estimation of Transaction Costs
• 2.4.1 Estimations of the Size of the Informal Sector
• 2.5 Open Questions
• Questions
• Further Reading
• 3 Repeated and Long-Term Transactions: On the Choice of Governance Structures with Given Institution
• 3.1 Introductory Remarks
• 3.2 From a Black Box to the Firm as a Team
• 3.3 Problems Associated with Asymmetric Information: The Principal-Agent Theory
• 3.4 Transaction Cost Economics
• 3.5 The Firm as a Collection of Assets
• 3.6 The Relevance of Internal Institutions
• 3.6.1 Example 1: Corporate Culture: On the Coordination of Interaction Situations within Firms
• 3.6.2 Example 2: On the Relevance of Reciprocity in Labor Relations
• 3.7 Open Questions
• Questions
• Further Reading
• 4 Institutions and Collective Action
• 4.1 Introductory Remarks
• 4.2 Explaining Politicians’ Behavior Under Given Institutions
• 4.2.1 Preliminary Remarks
• 4.2.2 Example 1: Rent Seeking
• 4.2.3 Example 2: Political Business Cycles
• 4.2.4 The Dilemma of the Strong State
• 4.3 Explaining Collective Action Using Internal Institutions
• 4.3.1 From Non-Repeated to Repeated Games
• 4.3.2 Evidence from the Laboratory
• 4.4 The Interplay between External and Internal Institutions and its Relevance for Collective Action
• 4.5 Open Questions
• Questions
• Further Reading
• 5 The Relevance of Institutions for Growth and Development
• 5.1 Introductory Remarks
• 5.2 Determinants of Economic Growth: Institutions, Geography, Culture?
• 5.2.1 Institutions
• 5.2.2 Geography
• 5.2.3 Culture
• 5.3 The Relevance of External Institutions for Economic Growth and Development
• 5.3.1 How to Measure External Institutions
• 5.3.2 Early Attempts to Measure External Institutions
• 5.3.3 One Measurement Attempt in Detail
• 5.3.3.1 Preliminary Remarks
• 5.3.3.2 The Economic Freedom Index
• Size of Government
• Legal System and Property Rights
• Sound Money
• Freedom to Trade Internationally
• Extent of Regulation in Banking, Labor, and Business
• Method of Evaluation
• 5.3.3.3 Criticisms of the Economic Freedom Index
• 5.3.4 Results of Empirical Studies
• 5.3.5 Institutions or Policies?
• 5.4 The Relevance of Internal Institutions for Economic Growth and Development
• 5.5 On the Interplay between External and Internal Institutions and its Relevance for Economic Growt
• 5.6 Open Questions
• Questions
• Further Reading
• Appendix A Ten-Minute Primer in Econometrics
• 6 Explaining Differences in External Institutions across Societies
• 6.1 Introductory Remarks
• 6.2 Origins and Change of Property Rights: A Traditional View
• 6.3 Origins of and Change in Property Rights and the State: Accounting for Political Economy Factors
• 6.4 Explaining Differences in Institutions
• 6.4.1 Preliminary Remarks
• 6.4.2 Explaining External Institutions Based on Geography
• 6.4.3 Explaining External Institutions Based on Culture or History
• 6.4.4 Explaining External Institutions Based on Social Conflict View
• 6.5 Institutional Change via Institutional Competition?
• 6.6 Elements of a General Theory
• 6.6.1 Preliminary Remarks
• 6.6.2 Satisficing Behavior
• 6.6.3 Collective Action Problems
• 6.6.4 Path Dependency of Institutional Change
• 6.6.5 Political Transaction Costs
• 6.6.6 The Relative Power of the Relevant Actors
• 6.6.7 The Relevance of Internal Institutions
• 6.6.8 A Short Summary
• 6.7 Open Questions
• Questions
• Further Reading
• 7 Explaining Change in Internal Institutions
• 7.1 Introductory Remarks
• 7.2 The Problem in Economic Terms
• 7.3 Hypotheses on the Origins of Norms
• 7.3.1 Evolutionary Approaches
• 7.3.2 Repetition or Reputation as Explanatory Factor?
• 7.3.3 An Attempted Synthesis
• 7.3.3.1 Regular Behavior
• 7.3.3.2 Interdependent Utility Functions
• 7.3.3.3 Norms of Cooperation
• 7.3.3.4 Concerning the Sanctioning Component
• 7.3.3.5 Outlook
• 7.4 Potential Triggers for Change in Internal Institutions
• 7.4.1 Introductory Remarks
• 7.4.2 Geography Again
• 7.4.3 External Institutions
• 7.5 Open Questions
• Questions
• Further Reading
• 8 On the Need for Normative Theory
• 8.1 Introductory Remarks
• 8.2 What is Normative Theory and Why Should We Study It?
• 8.3 Two Competing Normative Concepts
• 8.3.1 The Welfare Theoretical Approach
• 8.3.2 Hypothetical Consent: A Heuristic to Derive Normative Statements
• 8.3.3 Some Critical Comments on the Unanimity Test
• 8.4 Requirements for a Normative Theory from the Perspective of Institutional Economics
• 8.4.1 The Approach of Williamson
• 8.4.2 The Approach of Hayek
• 8.4.3 Consequences of the Two Approaches
• 8.5 Open Questions
• Questions
• Further Reading
• 9 Consequences for Economic Policy
• 9.1 Introductory Remarks
• 9.2 Policy Recommendations: The Traditional – Naïve – Approach
• 9.3 Activation of Internal Institutions through Government Action?
• 9.3.1 A Specific Example: Voluntary Commitment Declarations
• 9.4 Policy Reforms in Practice: Case Study of New Zealand
• 9.4.1 The Initial Situation in New Zealand
• 9.4.2 Overview of the Most Important Reforms
• 9.4.3 Explaining the Reforms
• 9.4.3.1 Underlying Theories
• 9.4.3.2 Persons Involved
• 9.4.3.3 Behavior-Channeling Institutions, Relevant Organizations
• 9.4.3.4 Favorable Circumstances
• 9.5 Open Questions
• Questions
• Further Reading
• 10 Outlook
• 10.1 Introductory Remarks
• 10.2 Institutions and Mental Models
• 10.3 Institutions and Ideas
• 10.4 Institutions and Individuals
• 10.5 Institutions beyond the Nation-State
• 10.6 Institutions and Identification
• 10.7 Where to Turn to Start Your Own Research?
• Further Reading
• References
• Index