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• Routledge Frontiers of Political Economy
• Contents
• Tables
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Original institutionalism
• Schmoller and the German historical school
• Institutions and organs
• Institutions, freedom and progress
• Custom and law
• Veblen’s ‘evolutionary institutionalism’
• The errors of the ‘non-Darwinian’ theories
• The limitations of Marx and of the historical school
• The case for an evolutionary science of economics
• Nature and origin of institutions
• Instincts and habits
• Veblenian dichotomy and dualisms
• Institutional evolution
• Cumulative causality
• The evolutionary selection of institutions
• Hamilton: ‘institutional economics’
• An advocate of institutional economics
• Social usage and habits
• Institutional conversion
• The ambivalence of institutions
• Commons: organizations and institutions
• The limitations of economic theories
• The ‘institutionalized mind’
• Going concerns
• The ‘working rules’
• A theory of transactions
• Collective action and ‘common law method’
• Institutionism, temporality and futurity
• Polanyi and the economy as an instituted process
• The forms of integration
• Problematical ‘disembeddedness’
• 3 The Austrian school and ‘ordoliberalism’
• Menger: the organic and pragmatic approaches
• Money as an organic institution
• A complex interaction
• Hayek’s ‘orders’ and ‘rules’
• The institutions of liberty
• Orders and rules
• Rules, division of knowledge and transmission of knowledge
• The State and the law
• Cultural evolution
• Eucken and ‘ordoliberalism’
• Economic order, property and planning
• The State as guardian of the competitive order
• Constitutive and regulatory principles
• 4 The new institutional economics
• Williamson and the mechanisms of governance
• The market, the firm and transaction costs
• The comparative efficiency of different modes of governance
• The intermediate position of the NIE
• North: formal and informal institutions
• The limitations of neo-classicism
• Formal and informal institutions, ‘enforcement’
• Power versus efficiency
• Organizations and institutions
• Institutional change
• Institutional matrix and ‘path dependence’
• Institutions and performance
• Game theory and comparative institutional analysis
• Aoki: institutions as shared beliefs
• Greif and the conjunction of rules, beliefs and organizations
• 5 Contemporary European currents of thought
• Regulation theory: historical macroeconomics
• The institutional forms of historical capitalism
• Institutions and institutionalized compromises
• Diversity of capitalisms, complementarity and hierarchy
• Crises
• The economics of conventions: interpreting the rules
• Conventions as institutions
• Inter-individual co-ordination: the scope for interpretation
• The economics of worth
• The multiplicity of forms of co-ordination
• Hodgson and the revival of the ‘old institutional economics’
• Layered reality and emergence
• The case for evolutionary thesmology
• Reconstitutive downward causation
• 6 Unity and diversity of institutionalisms
• Major common themes
• Remarkable diversity
• Theoretical differences
• Limited subject, general theory
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index