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• Cover
• Publisher’s Notice
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents in Brief
• Contents
• Preface
• About the Authors
• Chapter 1: The Market
• 1.1 Constructing a Model
• 1.2 Optimization and Equilibrium
• 1.3 The Demand Curve
• 1.4 The Supply Curve
• 1.5 Market Equilibrium
• 1.6 Comparative Statics
• 1.7 Other Ways to Allocate Apartments
• 1.8 Which Way Is Best?
• 1.9 Pareto Efficiency
• 1.10 Comparing Ways to Allocate Apartments
• 1.11 Rent Control in the Real World
• 1.12 Equilibrium in the Long Run
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 2: Budget Constraint
• 2.1 The Budget Constraint
• 2.2 Two Goods Are Often Enough
• 2.3 Properties of the Budget Set
• 2.4 How the Budget Line Changes
• 2.5 The Numeraire
• 2.6 Taxes, Subsidies, and Rationing
• 2.7 Budget Line Changes
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 3: Preferences
• 3.1 Consumer Preferences
• 3.2 Assumptions about Preferences
• 3.3 Indifference Curves
• 3.4 Examples of Preferences
• 3.5 Well-Behaved Preferences
• 3.6 The Marginal Rate of Substitution
• 3.7 Other Interpretations of the MRS
• 3.8 Behavior of the MRS
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 4: Utility
• 4.1 Cardinal Utility
• 4.2 Constructing a Utility Function
• 4.3 Some Examples of Utility Functions
• 4.4 Marginal Utility
• 4.5 Marginal Utility and MRS
• 4.6 An Example from the Electric Vehicle Industry
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 5: Choice
• 5.1 Optimal Choice
• 5.2 Consumer Demand
• 5.3 Some Examples
• 5.4 Using a Utility Function to Estimate the Welfare Impact of Price Changes
• 5.5 Implications of the MRS Condition
• 5.6 Choosing Taxes
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 6: Demand
• 6.1 Normal and Inferior Goods
• 6.2 Income Offer Curves and Engel Curves
• 6.3 Some Examples
• 6.4 Ordinary Goods and Giffen Goods
• 6.5 The Price Offer Curve and the Demand Curve
• 6.6 Some Examples
• 6.7 Substitutes and Complements
• 6.8 The Inverse Demand Function
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 7: Revealed Preference
• 7.1 The Idea of Revealed Preference
• 7.2 From Revealed Preference to Preference
• 7.3 Recovering Preferences
• 7.4 The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference
• 7.5 Checking WARP
• 7.6 The Strong Axiom of Revealed Preference
• 7.7 How to Check SARP
• 7.8 Index Numbers
• 7.9 Price Indices
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 8: Slutsky Equation
• 8.1 The Substitution Effect
• 8.2 The Income Effect
• 8.3 Sign of the Substitution Effect
• 8.4 The Total Change in Demand
• 8.5 Rates of Change
• 8.6 The Law of Demand
• 8.7 Examples of Income and Substitution Effects
• 8.8 Another Substitution Effect
• 8.9 Compensated Demand Curves
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 9: Buying and Selling
• 9.1 Net and Gross Demands
• 9.2 The Budget Constraint
• 9.3 Changing the Endowment
• 9.4 Price Changes
• 9.5 Food Bank Exchanges and the Gains from Trade
• 9.6 The Slutsky Equation Revisited
• 9.7 Use of the Slutsky Equation
• 9.8 Labor Supply
• 9.9 Comparative Statics of Labor Supply
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 10: Intertemporal Choice
• 10.1 The Budget Constraint
• 10.2 Preferences for Consumption
• 10.3 Comparative Statics
• 10.4 The Slutsky Equation and Intertemporal Choice
• 10.5 Inflation
• 10.6 Present Value: A Closer Look
• 10.7 Analyzing Present Value for Several Periods
• 10.8 Use of Present Value
• 10.9 Bonds
• 10.10 Taxes
• 10.11 Choice of the Interest Rate
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 11: Asset Markets
• 11.1 Rates of Return
• 11.2 Arbitrage and Present Value
• 11.3 Adjustments for Differences among Assets
• 11.4 Assets with Consumption Returns
• 11.5 Taxation of Asset Returns
• 11.6 Market Bubbles
• 11.7 Applications
• 11.8 Financial Institutions
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 12: Uncertainty
• 12.1 Contingent Consumption
• 12.2 Utility Functions and Probabilities
• 12.3 Expected Utility
• 12.4 Why Expected Utility Is Reasonable
• 12.5 Risk Aversion
• 12.6 Diversification
• 12.7 Risk Spreading
• 12.8 Role of the Stock Market
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 13: Risky Assets
• 13.1 Mean-Variance Utility
• 13.2 Measuring Risk
• 13.3 Counterparty Risk
• 13.4 Equilibrium in a Market for Risky Assets
• 13.5 How Returns Adjust
• Chapter Review
• 14 Consumer’s Surplus
• 14.1 Demand for a Discrete Good
• 14.2 Constructing Utility from Demand
• 14.3Other Interpretations of Consumer’s Surplus
• 14.4From Consumer’s Surplus to Consumers’ Surplus
• 14.5 Approximating a Continuous Demand
• 14.6 Quasilinear Utility
• 14.7Interpreting the Change in Consumer’s Surplus
• 14.8 Compensating and Equivalent Variation
• 14.9Producer’s Surplus
• 14.10 Benefit-Cost Analysis
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 15: Market Demand
• 15.1 From Individual to Market Demand
• 15.2 The Inverse Demand Function
• 15.3 Discrete Goods
• 15.4 The Extensive and the Intensive Margin
• 15.5 Elasticity
• 15.6 Elasticity and Demand
• 15.7 Elasticity and Revenue
• 15.8 Constant Elasticity Demands
• 15.9 Elasticity and Marginal Revenue
• 15.10 Marginal Revenue Curves
• 15.11 Income Elasticity
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 16: Equilibrium
• 16.1 Supply
• 16.2 Market Equilibrium
• 16.3 Two Special Cases
• 16.4 Inverse Demand and Supply Curves
• 16.5 Comparative Statics
• 16.6 Taxes
• 16.7 Passing Along a Tax
• 16.8 The Deadweight Loss of a Tax
• 16.9 Pareto Efficiency
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 17: Measurement
• 17.1 Summarize Data
• 17.2 Test
• 17.3 Estimating Demand Using Experimental Data
• 17.4 Effect of Treatment
• 17.5 Estimating Demand Using Observational Data
• 17.6 Identification
• 17.7 What Can Go Wrong?
• 17.8 Policy Evaluation
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 18: Auctions
• 18.1 Classification of Auctions
• 18.2 Auction Design
• 18.3 Other Auction Forms
• 18.4 Position Auctions
• 18.5 Should You Advertise on Your Brand?
• 18.6 Auction Revenue and Number of Bidders
• 18.7 Problems with Auctions
• 18.8The Winner’s Curse
• 18.9 Stable Matching Problem
• 18.10 Mechanism Design
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 19: Technology
• 19.1 Inputs and Outputs
• 19.2 Describing Technological Constraints
• 19.3 Examples of Technology
• 19.4 Properties of Technology
• 19.5 The Marginal Product
• 19.6 The Technical Rate of Substitution
• 19.7 Diminishing Marginal Product
• 19.8 Diminishing Technical Rate of Substitution
• 19.9 The Long Run and the Short Run
• 19.10 Returns to Scale
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 20: Profit Maximization
• 20.1 Profits
• 20.2 The Organization of Firms
• 20.3 Profits and Stock Market Value
• 20.4 The Boundaries of the Firm
• 20.5 Fixed and Variable Factors
• 20.6 Short-Run Profit Maximization
• 20.7 Comparative Statics
• 20.8 Profit Maximization in the Long Run
• 20.9 Inverse Factor Demand Curves
• 20.10 Profit Maximization and Returns to Scale
• 20.11 Revealed Profitability
• 20.12 Cost Minimization
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 21: Cost Minimization
• 21.1 Cost Minimization
• 21.2 Revealed Cost Minimization
• 21.3 Returns to Scale and the Cost Function
• 21.4 Long-Run and Short-Run Costs
• 21.5 Fixed and Overhead Costs
• 21.6 Sunk Costs
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 22: Cost Curves
• 22.1 Average Costs
• 22.2 Marginal Costs
• 22.3 Marginal Costs and Variable Costs
• 22.4 Cost Curves for Online Auctions
• 22.5 Long-Run Costs
• 22.6 Discrete Levels of Plant Size
• 22.7 Long-Run Marginal Costs
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 23: Firm Supply
• 23.1 Market Environments
• 23.2 Pure Competition
• 23.3 The Supply Decision of a Competitive Firm
• 23.4 An Exception
• 23.5 Another Exception
• 23.6 The Inverse Supply Function
• 23.7Profits and Producer’s Surplus
• 23.8 The Long-Run Supply Curve of a Firm
• 23.9 Overhead Costs in the Long Run
• 23.10 Long-Run Constant Average Costs
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 24: Industry Supply
• 24.1 Short-Run Industry Supply
• 24.2 Industry Equilibrium in the Short Run
• 24.3 Industry Equilibrium in the Long Run
• 24.4 The Long-Run Supply Curve
• 24.5 The Meaning of Zero Profits
• 24.6 Fixed Factors and Economic Rent
• 24.7 What Determines Economic Rent?
• 24.8 The Politics of Rent
• 24.9 Industry Supply with Different Technologies: Electricity Generation
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 25: Monopoly
• 25.1 Maximizing Profits
• 25.2 Linear Demand Curve and Monopoly
• 25.3 Markup Pricing
• 25.4 Inefficiency of Monopoly
• 25.5 Deadweight Loss of Monopoly
• 25.6 Patents
• 25.7 Natural Monopoly
• 25.8 What Causes Monopolies?
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 26: Monopoly Behavior
• 26.1 Price Discrimination
• 26.2 First-Degree Price Discrimination
• 26.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination
• 26.4 Third-Degree Price Discrimination
• 26.5 Bundling
• 26.6 Two-Part Tariffs
• 26.7 Monopolistic Competition
• 26.8 A Location Model of Product Differentiation
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 27: Factor Markets
• 27.1 Monopoly in the Output Market
• 27.2 Monopsony
• 27.3 The Minimum Wage
• 27.4 Upstream and Downstream Monopolies
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 28: Oligopoly
• 28.1 Choosing a Strategy
• 28.2 Quantity Leadership
• 28.3 Price Leadership
• 28.4 Comparing Price Leadership and Quantity Leadership
• 28.5 Simultaneous Quantity Setting
• 28.6 An Example of Cournot Equilibrium
• 28.7 Adjustment to Equilibrium
• 28.8 Many Firms in Cournot Equilibrium
• 28.9 Simultaneous Price Setting
• 28.10 Collusion
• 28.11 Punishment Strategies
• 28.12 Comparison of the Solutions
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 29: Game Theory
• 29.1 The Payoff Matrix of a Game
• 29.2 Nash Equilibrium
• 29.3 Mixed Strategies
• 29.4The Prisoner’s Dilemma
• 29.5 Repeated Games
• 29.6 Enforcing a Cartel
• 29.7 Sequential Games
• 29.8 A Game of Entry Deterrence
• 29.9 Supplier Hold-Up
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 30: Game Applications
• 30.1 Best Response Curves
• 30.2 Mixed Strategies
• 30.3 Games of Coordination
• 30.4 Games of Competition
• 30.5 Games of Coexistence
• 30.6 Games of Commitment
• 30.7 Bargaining
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 31: Behavioral Economics
• 31.1 Framing Effects in Consumer Choice
• 31.2 Uncertainty
• 31.3 Time
• 31.4 Strategic Interaction and Social Norms
• 31.5 Assessment of Behavioral Economics
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 32: Exchange
• 32.1: The Edgeworth Box
• 32.2: Trade
• 32.3: Pareto Efficient Allocations
• 32.4: Market Trade
• 32.5: The Algebra of Equilibrium
• 32.6Walras’s Law
• 32.7: Relative Prices
• 32.8: The Existence of Equilibrium
• 32.9: Equilibrium and Efficiency
• 32.10: The Algebra of Efficiency
• 32.11: Efficiency and Equilibrium
• 32.12: Implications of the First Welfare Theorem
• 32.13: Implications of the Second Welfare Theorem
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 33: Production
• 33.1 The Robinson Crusoe Economy
• 33.2 Crusoe, Inc.
• 33.3 The Firm
• 33.4 Robinson’s Problem
• 33.5 Putting Them Together
• 33.6 Different Technologies
• 33.7 Production and the First Welfare Theorem
• 33.8 Production and the Second Welfare Theorem
• 33.9 Production Possibilities
• 33.10 Comparative Advantage
• 33.11 Pareto Efficiency
• 33.12 Castaways, Inc.
• 33.13 Robinson and Friday as Consumers
• 33.14 Decentralized Resource Allocation
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 34: Welfare
• 34.1 Aggregation of Preferences
• 34.2 Social Welfare Functions
• 34.3 Welfare Maximization
• 34.4 Individualistic Social Welfare Functions
• 34.5 Fair Allocations
• 34.6 Envy and Equity
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 35: Externalities
• 35.1 Smokers and Nonsmokers
• 35.2 Quasilinear Preferences and the Coase Theorem
• 35.3 Production Externalities
• 35.4 Interpretation of the Conditions
• 35.5 Market Signals
• 35.6 Pollution Taxes and Pollution Permit Trading
• 35.7 The Tragedy of the Commons
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 36: Public Goods
• 36.1 When to Provide a Public Good
• 36.2 Private Provision of the Public Good
• 36.3 Free Riding
• 36.4 Different Levels of the Public Good
• 36.5 Quasilinear Preferences and Public Goods
• 36.6 The Free Rider Problem
• 36.7 Comparison to Private Goods
• 36.8 Voting
• 36.9 The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism
• 36.10 Examples of VCG
• 36.11 Problems with the VCG
• Chapter Review
• Appendix
• Chapter 37: Asymmetric Information
• 37.1 The Market for Lemons
• 37.2 Quality Choice
• 37.3 Adverse Selection
• 37.4 Moral Hazard
• 37.5 Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection
• 37.6 Signaling
• 37.7 Incentives
• 37.8 Asymmetric Information
• Chapter Review
• Chapter 38: Information Technology
• 38.1 Systems Competition
• 38.2 The Problem of Complements
• 38.3 Lock-In
• 38.4 Network Externalities
• 38.5 Market Dynamics
• 38.6 Implications of Network Externalities
• 38.7 Two-sided Markets
• Chapter Review
• Mathematical Appendix
• A.1 Functions
• A.2 Graphs
• A.3 Properties of Functions
• A.4 Inverse Functions
• A.5 Equations and Identities
• A.6 Linear Functions
• A.7 Changes and Rates of Change
• A.8 Slopes and Intercepts
• A.9 Absolute Values and Logarithms
• A.10 Derivatives
• A.11 Second Derivatives
• A.12 The Product Rule and the Chain Rule
• A.13 Partial Derivatives
• A.14 Optimization
• A.15 Constrained Optimization
• Answers
• Index