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• Half-Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Series Editor’s Preface
• Introduction
• 1 Analysing Knowledge
• The project
• The classical account of knowledge
• Gettier-style counterexamples
• No false lemmas
• External and internal epistemic conditions
• The epistemological externalism/internalism distinction
• Further reading
• 2 Anti-Luck Epistemology
• Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem
• Formulating the anti-luck condition (I): the sensitivity principle
• Interlude: possible worlds
• Back to the sensitivity principle
• The lottery problem
• Methods
• Formulating the anti-luck condition (II): the safety principle
• Anti-luck epistemology reconsidered
• Robust anti-luck epistemology
• Problems with robust anti-luck epistemology (I): necessary propositions
• Problems with robust anti-luck epistemology (II): the temp case
• Concluding remarks
• Further reading
• 3 Virtue Epistemology
• Problems for process reliabilism
• From process reliabilism to virtue epistemology
• Virtue reliabilism versus virtue responsibilism
• Modest virtue epistemology
• Robust virtue epistemology
• Two problems for robust virtue epistemology
• Concluding remarks
• Further reading
• 4 Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology
• Recap
• Anti-luck virtue epistemology
• Anti-luck virtue epistemology and knowledge of necessary propositions
• Interlude: is anti-luck virtue epistemology a reductive theory of knowledge?
• Diagnosi
• Concluding remarks
• Further reading
• 5 Externalism and Internalism about Knowledge
• Introduction
• Three internalist theses
• Classical versus non-classical epistemic internalism
• Epistemological disjunctivism
• Reflectively accessible factive reasons
• Back to the epistemic externalism/internalism distinction
• Further reading
• 6 Radical Scepticism
• Introduction
• The closure-based radical sceptical argument
• Responding to the closure-based scepticial argument (I): the denial of the closure principle
• Responding to the closure-based sceptical argument (II): attributer contextualism
• Responding to the closure-based sceptical argument (III): neo-Mooreanism
• Concluding remarks
• Further reading
• 7 Understanding and the Value of Knowledge
• The value problem for knowledge
• Knowledge, achievement and final value
• Understanding and final value
• Concluding remarks
• Further reading
• Bibliography
• Index