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• COVER PAGE
• TITLE PAGE
• COPYRIGHT PAGE
• TRANSLATORS’ NOTE
• PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION, 1934
• PREFACE TO THE FIRST ENGLISH EDITION, 1959
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS, 1960 AND 1968
• PART I: INTRODUCTION TO THE LOGIC OF SCIENCE
• 1. A SURVEY OF SOME FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEMS
• 1. THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION
• 2. ELIMINATION OF PSYCHOLOGISM
• 3. DEDUCTIVE TESTING OF THEORIES
• 4. THE PROBLEM OF DEMARCATION
• 5. EXPERIENCE AS A METHOD
• 6. FALSIFIABILITY AS A CRITERION OF DEMARCATION
• 7. THE PROBLEM OF THE ‘EMPIRICAL BASIS’
• 8. SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVE CONVICTION
• 2. ON THE PROBLEM OF A THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD
• 9. WHY METHODOLOGICAL DECISIONS ARE INDISPENSABLE
• 10. THE NATURALISTIC APPROACH TO THE THEORY OF METHOD
• 11. METHODOLOGICAL RULES AS CONVENTIONS
• PART II: SOME STRUCTURAL COMPONENTS OF A THEORY OF EXPERIENCE
• 3. THEORIES
• 12. CAUSALITY, EXPLANATION, AND THE DEDUCTION OF PREDICTIONS
• 13. STRICT AND NUMERICAL UNIVERSALITY
• 14. UNIVERSAL CONCEPTS AND INDIVIDUAL CONCEPTS
• 15. STRICTLY UNIVERSAL AND EXISTENTIAL STATEMENTS
• 16. THEORETICAL SYSTEMS
• 17. SOME POSSIBILITIES OF INTERPRETING A SYSTEM OF AXIOMS
• 18. LEVELS OF UNIVERSALITY. THE MODUS TOLLENS
• 4. FALSIFIABILITY
• 19. SOME CONVENTIONALIST OBJECTIONS
• 20. METHODOLOGICAL RULES
• 21. LOGICAL INVESTIGATION OF FALSIFIABILITY
• 22. FALSIFIABILITY AND FALSIFICATION
• 23. OCCURRENCES AND EVENTS
• 24. FALSIFIABILITY AND CONSISTENCY
• 5. THE PROBLEM OF THE EMPIRICAL BASIS
• 25. PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCES AS EMPIRICAL BASIS: PSYCHOLOGISM
• 26. CONCERNING THE SO-CALLED ‘PROTOCOL SENTENCES’
• 27. THE OBJECTIVITY OF THE EMPIRICAL BASIS
• 28. BASIC STATEMENTS
• 29. THE RELATIVITY OF BASIC STATEMENTS. RESOLUTION OF FRIES’S TRILEMMA
• 30. THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
• 6. DEGREES OF TESTABILITY
• 31. A PROGRAMME AND AN ILLUSTRATION
• 32. HOW ARE CLASSES OF POTENTIAL FALSIFIERS TO BE COMPARED?
• 33. DEGREES OF FALSIFIABILITY COMPARED BY MEANS OF THE SUBCLASS RELATION
• 34. THE STRUCTURE OF THE SUBCLASS RELATION. LOGICAL PROBABILITY
• 35. EMPIRICAL CONTENT, ENTAILMENT, AND DEGREES OF FALSIFIABILITY
• 36. LEVELS OF UNIVERSALITY AND DEGREES OF PRECISION
• 37. LOGICAL RANGES. NOTES ON THE THEORY OF MEASUREMENT
• 38. DEGREES OF TESTABILITY COMPARED BY REFERENCE TO DIMENSIONS
• 39. THE DIMENSION OF A SET OF CURVES
• 40. TWO WAYS OF REDUCING THE NUMBER OF DIMENSIONS OF A SET OF CURVES
• 7. SIMPLICITY
• 41. ELIMINATION OF THE AESTHETIC AND THE PRAGMATIC CONCEPTS OF SIMPLICITY
• 42. THE METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEM OF SIMPLICITY
• 43. SIMPLICITY AND DEGREE OF FALSIFIABILITY
• 44. GEOMETRICAL SHAPE AND FUNCTIONAL FORM
• 45. THE SIMPLICITY OF EUCLIDEAN GEOMETRY
• 46. CONVENTIONALISM AND THE CONCEPT OF SIMPLICITY
• 8. PROBABILITY
• 47. THE PROBLEM OF INTERPRETING PROBABILITY STATEMENTS
• 48. SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE INTERPRETATIONS
• 49. THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF THE THEORY OF CHANCE
• 50. THE FREQUENCY THEORY OF VON MISES
• 51. PLAN FOR A NEW THEORY OF PROBABILITY
• 52. RELATIVE FREQUENCY WITHIN A FINITE CLASS
• 53. SELECTION, INDEPENDENCE, INSENSITIVENESS, IRRELEVANCE
• 54. FINITE SEQUENCES. ORDINAL SELECTION AND NEIGHBOURHOOD SELECTION
• 55. N-FREEDOM IN FINITE SEQUENCES
• 56. SEQUENCES OF SEGMENTS. THE FIRST FORM OF THE BINOMIAL FORMULA
• 57. INFINITE SEQUENCES. HYPOTHETICAL ESTIMATES OF FREQUENCY
• 58. AN EXAMINATION OF THE AXIOM OF RANDOMNESS
• 59. CHANCE-LIKE SEQUENCES. OBJECTIVE PROBABILITY
• 60. BERNOULLI’S PROBLEM
• 61. THE LAW OF GREAT NUMBERS (BERNOULLI’S THEOREM)
• 62. BERNOULLI’S THEOREM AND THE INTERPRETATION OF PROBABILITY STATEMENTS
• 63. BERNOULLI’S THEOREM AND THE PROBLEM OF CONVERGENCE
• 64. ELIMINATION OF THE AXIOM OF CONVERGENCE. SOLUTION OF THE ‘FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM OF THE THEORY OF CHANCE’
• 65. THE PROBLEM OF DECIDABILITY
• 66. THE LOGICAL FORM OF PROBABILITY STATEMENTS
• 67. A PROBABILISTIC SYSTEM OF SPECULATIVE METAPHYSICS
• 68. PROBABILITY IN PHYSICS
• 69. LAW AND CHANCE
• 70. THE DEDUCIBILITY OF MACRO LAWS FROM MICRO LAWS
• 71. FORMALLY SINGULAR PROBABILITY STATEMENTS
• 72. THE THEORY OF RANGE
• 9. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON QUANTUM THEORY
• 73. HEISENBERG’S PROGRAMME AND THE UNCERTAINTY RELATIONS
• 74. A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE STATISTICAL INTERPRETATION OF QUANTUM THEORY
• 75. A STATISTICAL RE-INTERPRETATION OF THE UNCERTAINTY FORMULAE
• 76. AN ATTEMPT TO ELIMINATE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS BY INVERTING HEISENBERG’S PROGRAMME; WITH APPLICATIONS
• 77. DECISIVE EXPERIMENTS
• 78. INDETERMINIST METAPHYSICS
• 10. CORROBORATION, OR HOW A THEORY STANDS UP TO TESTS
• 79. CONCERNING THE SO-CALLED VERIFICATION OF HYPOTHESES
• 80. THE PROBABILITY OF A HYPOTHESIS AND THE PROBABILITY OF EVENTS: CRITICISM OF PROBABILITY LOGIC
• 81. INDUCTIVE LOGIC AND PROBABILITY LOGIC
• 82. THE POSITIVE THEORY OF CORROBORATION: HOW A HYPOTHESIS MAY ‘PROVE ITS METTLE’
• 83. CORROBORABILITY, TESTABILITY, AND LOGICAL PROBABILITY*1
• 84. REMARKS CONCERNING THE USE OF THE CONCEPTS ‘TRUE’ AND ‘CORROBORATED’
• 85. THE PATH OF SCIENCE
• APPENDIX I: DEFINITION OF THE DIMENSION OF A THEORY (CF. SECTIONS 38 AND 39)
• APPENDIX II: THE GENERAL CALCULUS OF FREQUENCY IN FINITE CLASSES (CF. SECTIONS 52 AND 53)
• APPENDIX III: DERIVATION OF THE FIRST FORM OF THE BINOMIAL FORMULA (FOR FINITE SEQUENCES OF OVERLAPPING SEGMENTS, CF. SECTION 56)
• APPENDIX IV: A METHOD OF CONSTRUCTING MODELS OF RANDOM SEQUENCES (CF. SECTIONS 58, 64, AND 66)
• APPENDIX V: EXAMINATION OF AN OBJECTION. THE TWO-SLIT EXPERIMENT (CF.SECTION 76)
• APPENDIX VI: CONCERNING A NON-PREDICTIVE PROCEDURE OF MEASURING (CF.SECTION 77)
• APPENDIX VII: REMARKS CONCERNING AN IMAGINARY EXPERIMENT (CF. SECTION 77)
• NOTE TO NEW APPENDICES, 1959 EDITION
• APPENDIX I: TWO NOTES ON INDUCTION AND DEMARCATION, 1933–1934
• A CRITERION OF THE EMPIRICAL CHARACTER OF THEORETICAL SYSTEMS
• ON THE SO-CALLED ‘LOGIC OF INDUCTION’ AND THE ‘PROBABILITY OF HYPOTHESES’
• APPENDIX II: A NOTE ON PROBABILITY, 1938
• A SET OF INDEPENDENT AXIOMS FOR PROBABILITY
• APPENDIX III: ON THE HEURISTIC USE OF THE CLASSICAL DEFINITION OF PROBABILITY, ESPECIALLY FOR DERIVING THE GENERAL MULTIPLICATION THEOREM
• APPENDIX IV: THE FORMAL THEORY OF PROBABILITY
• APPENDIX V: DERIVATIONS IN THE FORMAL THEORY OF PROBABILITY
• APPENDIX VI: ON OBJECTIVE DISORDER OR RANDOMNESS
• APPENDIX VII: ZERO PROBABILITY AND THE FINE-STRUCTURE OF PROBABILITY AND OF CONTENT
• APPENDIX VIII: CONTENT, SIMPLICITY, AND DIMENSION
• APPENDIX IX: CORROBORATION, THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE, AND STATISTICAL TESTS
• DEGREE OF CONFIRMATION
• A SECOND NOTE ON DEGREE OF CONFIRMATION
• A THIRD NOTE ON DEGREE OF CORROBORATION OR CONFIRMATION
• APPENDIX X: UNIVERSALS, DISPOSITIONS, AND NATURAL OR PHYSICAL NECESSITY
• APPENDIX XI: ON THE USE AND MISUSE OF IMAGINARY EXPERIMENTS, ESPECIALLY IN QUANTUM THEORY
• APPENDIX XII: THE EXPERIMENT OF EINSTEIN, PODOLSKY, AND ROSEN
• A LETTER FROM ALBERT EINSTEIN, 1935