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• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Philosophy of science as epistemology and metaphysics
• Part I: The Scientific Method
• 1. Induction and Inductivism
• 1.1 The sceptic’s challenge
• 1.2 The scientific revolution
• 1.3 The ‘new tool’ of induction
• 1.4 (Naïve) inductivism
• Further reading
• 2. The Problem of Induction and Other Problems with Inductivism
• 2.1 The problem of induction
• 2.2 Solutions and dissolutions of the problem of induction
• 2.3 Inductivism and the history of science
• 2.4 Theory and observation
• 2.5 Conclusions
• Further reading
• 3. Falsificationism
• 3.1 Popper and the critique of Marxism and psychoanalysis
• 3.2 Popper’s solution to the problem of induction
• 3.3 The context of discovery and the context of justification
• 3.4 The Duhem problem
• 3.5 Problems with falsificationism
• 3.6 Conclusions
• Further reading
• 4. Revolutions and Rationality
• 4.1 The received view of science
• 4.2 Kuhn’s revolutionary history of science
• 4.3 Paradigms and normal science
• 4.4 The Copernican revolution
• 4.5 Theory and observation
• 4.6 Incommensurability
• 4.7 Relativism and the role of reason in science
• Further reading
• Part II: Realism and Antirealism about Science
• 5. Scientific Realism
• 5.1 Appearance and reality
• 5.2 The metaphysics of the external world
• 5.3 Semantics
• 5.4 Standard scientific realism
• 5.5 Antirealism
• Further reading
• 6. Underdetermination
• 6.1 Underdetermination
• 6.2 Constructive empiricism
• Further reading
• 7. Explanation and Inference
• 7.1 Explanation
• 7.2 Inference to the best explanation
• 7.3 Common sense, realism and constructive empiricism
• Further reading
• 8. Realism About What?
• 8.1 Theory change
• 8.2 Multiple models
• 8.3 Idealisation
• 8.4 Structural realism
• Further reading
• Glossary
• Bibiliography
• Index